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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Caribbean nation of Haiti is located on the western third of the 
island of Hispaniola, and shares that island with the Dominican 
Republic. To its northwest lies the Windward Passage, a strip of water 
that separates Haiti from the island of Cuba by approximately fifty 
miles. 1 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the Windward Passage has 
been used as the maritime route of choice by boatpeople fleeing Haiti 
for political reasons or seeking greater economic opportunity abroad.2 
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I. See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 1993 167-69 
(1994). See generally FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
DoMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI: COUNTRY STUDIES 243-373 (Richard A. Haggerty 
ed., 1991) [hereinafter COUNTRY STUDIES]. 
2. Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. See COUNTRY 
STUDIES, supra note 1, at 881. There is no question that poverty is widespread, but 
poverty is not the only reason why people have fled the island throughout the 1980s and 
1990s. See Robert D. Novak, Collison Course on Haiti, WASH. POST, May 2, 1994, at 
Al9 (explaining that the Clinton administration is taking a harder line against "[t]he 
military rulers that will expand the flow of refugees, who are fleeing economic 
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Haiti was one of the first nations in the Americas to obtain indepen-
dence. During the last decades of the eighteenth century, the Haitian 
Revolution, a fierce reaction to slavery and the socio-economic structures 
of the sugar plantation, created the first black republic in modem times. 
The revolution also resulted in Haiti being the second country in the 
Americas, after the United States, to declare its independence from 
European colonial masters.3 However, unlike the United States, 
independence did not lead to a democratic political culture in Haiti. For 
most of its independent history, Haiti has been governed by a repressive 
minority. Thus, as the 1980s decade began, Haitian citizens found 
themselves suppressed.4 
deprivation rather than tyranny"). 
Historians have written that poverty and land pressure have led Haitians to seek 
opportunities abroad, especially in Cuba and the Dominican Republic to work in sugar 
plantations. Haitians experienced cruelty from the governments of those countries. In 
Cuba they were harshly expelled in large numbers during the 1930s. In the Dominican 
Republic, from 5,000 to 15,000 Haitians living on the underpopulated Dominican side 
of the border were massacred by the Dominican army in 1937. As late as the 1980s 
Haitians working in Dominican sugar plantations were living in forced labor conditions. 
The Dominican Republic has periodically repatriated Haitian workers. For example, in 
1991 it is estimated that between 25,000 to 50,000 Haitians were coerced to return to 
Haiti "voluntarily." See Bill Frelick, Haitian Boat Interdiction and Return: First 
Asylum and First Principles of Refugee Protection, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 675, 684-85 
(1993). 
In the 1950s and 1960s Haitians were employed in the construction industry in the 
Bahamas. The shift of Haitians from those countries closest in geography to their 
homeland (Cuba, Dominican Republic, and Bahamas) to South Florida in the 1970s and 
1980s has three root causes: ( 1) the construction industry declined in the Bahamas, (2) 
an economic boom in South Florida which was a consequence of the economic activity 
of the newly arrived Cuban refugees, and (3) "the increasing political repression of the 
Haitian dictator Francois (Papa Doc) Duvalier." Political repression continued under 
Papa Doc's son and successor, Jean Claude (Baby Doc) Duvalier. See J.H. PARRY ET 
AL., A SHORT HISTORY OF THE WEST INDIES 296-97 ( 4th ed. 1987). 
3. See COUNTRY STUDIES, supra note 1, at 203. Formal emancipation against 
France occurred in 1804. However, Haitians had been fighting the Europeans since the 
1790s. Haitians were at the forefront of the slave revolts throughout the West Indies 
during those decades. See PARRY ET AL., supranote 2, at 137-50 (discussingthe second 
American War of Independence and the leading role that Haitians performed in that 
conflict). 
4. See ELIZABETH ABBOTT, HAITI: THE Duv ALIERS AND THEIR LEGACY 8-77 
(1988). This section describes Haiti's political history, including the nineteen year 
(1915-1934) occupation by United States armed forces, up to the Duvalier dynasty. The 
American occupation came at a time when the United States was expanding beyond its 
continental borders. In the Caribbean, the 1898 Spanish-American War brought Cuba 
and Puerto Rico directly under United States military control, Panama was taken in 1903, 
and a customs presence was established in the Dominican Republic in 1905. The 
ostensible excuse for the Haiti invasion was to stabilize its political culture which 
suffered from chaos, and authoritarian and corrupt administration. However, the 
American troops were heavy handed in their attempts to control the populace who 
resented the invaders. The American occupation ended Haiti's isolation from the world 
and improved Haiti's transportation and communication infrastructure. The most 
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This Article discuses various aspects of United States/Haitian relations 
during the 1980s and 1990s. It begins with a brief narrative of Haiti's 
political culture during the 1980s and 1990s. It will then examine 
United States domestic immigration law and policy as applied to Haitian 
asylum-seekers who have reached the shores of the United States or who 
have been apprehended in the territorial sea. Additionally, this Article 
will examine foreign policy aimed at preventing Haitians from fleeing 
their homeland by establishing an interdiction program in international 
waters as well as an in-country refugee processing center. Further, this 
Article will discuss the legislative policies of the United States Congress 
in light of the domestic and foreign policies pursued by the executive 
branch toward Haiti. Finally, it will conclude with certain observations 
and recommendations. 
A. Duvalierism and Post-Duvalierism 
Haiti began the 1980s under the rule of the dictator Jean-Claude 
Duvalier, who took over the government upon the death of his father, 
Francois Duvalier.5 Jean-Claude Duvalier's mismanagement and 
corruption alienated various sectors of Haiti's establishment, not to 
mention the majority of Haitians themselves. 6. Widespread antipathy 
toward the Duvalier regime seemed to ignite after a 1983 visit to Haiti 
by Pope John Paul II, who called for greater social and economic justice, 
as well as for greater democracy.7 By the beginning of 1986, street 
demonstrations, rioting, and looting had spread throughout the provinces 
and Port-au-Prince, the country's capital.8 During this time it was 
evident that Haiti's army was plotting against the Duvalier regime. For 
its part, the United States began to pressure Duvalier to give up the reins 
enduring legacy of the American occupation was the change made in Haiti's military 
establishment. Before 1915, the Haitian military was very political and over-officered. 
After the Americans left in 1934, it was well-trained and efficient. Id. at 34, 46-373. 
5. Francois Duvalier became President of Haiti in 1957. In 1964 he declared 
himself President-for-Life and controlled the country through terror institutionalized by 
the Ton-Ton Macoutes. The feared Ton-Ton Macoutes were initially designed as rural 
militia, but developed into a secret force that mainly controlled the countryside. It is 
estimated that more than 30,000 Haitians were killed for political reasons during Francois 
Duvalier's regime. See COUNTRY STUDIES, supra note 1, at 232-35. 
6. Id. at 234-36. 
7. For a description of the Pope's visit see ABBOTT, supra note 4, at 261-63. 
8. COUNTRY STUDIES, supra note 1, at 237. 
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of the government and leave the country.9 Finally on February 7, 1986, 
Jean-Claude Duvalier, his family, and close advisors departed from 
Haiti. 10 While the Duvalier dynasty in Haitian politics had ended, its 
political and human rights legacy remained. 11 
The post-Duvalier period began with the expectation that the Duvalier 
legacy of political terror, human rights abuses, and economic despair 
would be improved. 12 Jean-Claude Duvalier left a civilian-military 
junta, the National Council of Government, to administer the govern-
ment. Unfortunately, Haiti experienced a succession of short term 
governments which did not make any significant improvement in the 
political or economic life of the country. Human rights conditions saw 
only marginal improvement during the post-Duvalier period. 13 Conse-
quently, this period failed to advance in the democratization process. 14 
B. Election of President Aristide and Neo-Duvalierism 
In March 1990 Ertha Pascal-Trouillot, a judge sitting on Haiti's 
highest court, was sworn into the Presidency. 15 The provisional 
government turned to the Organization of American States (OAS) for 
assistance in preparing and monitoring the upcoming December 
9. Id The United States worked through its intermediary, Jamaica. 
10. Id at 238. 
1 1. See AMERICAS WATCH & NATIONAL COALITION FOR HAITIAN REFUGEES, 
DUVALIERISM SINCE DUVALIER 1-4 (1986). For twenty-nine years the Duvaliers had 
accumulated one of the Western Hemisphere's worst human rights records. The United 
States government had certified that human rights were steadily improving under the 
Duvalier regime during the early 1980s. It was only in the year of the Duvalier 
government's collapse, 1986, that the United States refused to certify that the Haitian 
government complied with human rights conditions under United States law. The 
certification was a prerequisite for continued military aid. While not an excuse for 
United States certification of Haiti's human rights conditions during this period, 
certification should be considered in the context that Haiti's neighbor is Cuba, which was 
an important client state of the former Soviet Union. Id 
12. Domingo E. Acevedo, The Haitian Crisis and the OAS Response, in 
ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 126 (Lori 
F. Damrosch ed., 1973). 
13. Id at 127. A particularly traumatic experience occurred during the 1987
elections when on election day, November 29, 1987, numerous voters were massacred 
and the National Council of Government disbanded the Presidential Electoral Council, 
in effect ending the democratization process which began immediately after the downfall 
of Jean-Claude Duvalier. 
14. Id at 128. 
15. Id 
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elections. 16 In addition to the Organization of American States, the 
United Nations also provided observers to monitor the elections. 17 
Free and fair elections took place on December 16, 1990. The 
Reverend Jean-Bertrand Aristide won those elections with popular 
support, garnishing sixty-seven percent of the vote. 18 On February 7, 
1991, Jean-Bertrand Aristide became the country's first democratically 
elected President. 19 The Aristide regime barely lasted seven months. 
On September 30, 1991, the commander-in-chief of the military, who 
had been appointed by President Aristide himself, took over control of 
the government and forced the president to leave the country. 20 
President Aristide quickly found himself living in exile in Washington, 
D.C.21 
In the aftermath of the coup d'etat, the military forces returned to the 
politics of repression which had characterized the Duvalier dynasty.22 
The many civic, peasant, youth, grass roots, professional, and other 
organizations that were established during the post-Duvalier period were 
systematically attacked by the military, police, paramilitary, and 
affiliated forces. 23 By dismantling these organizations, the de facto 
rulers further diminished the possibility of a return to democracy. For 
example, even if President Aristide were to have been returned, it would 
have been difficult for him to transform his personal appeal into a 
16. Id. at 128, 129. The OAS and Haitian government agreed that the OAS would 
provide advisors and observers to the election. Advisors were to provide legal, 
professional, logistic, and technical support in preparing and implementing the elections, 
while observers followed the progress of the elections including providing reports on 
complaints after an investigation of facts. By the time the elections actually took place 
the OAS group consisted of approximately 200 persons from 26 member OAS countries. 
Id. 
17. Id. at 129. 
18. Id. at 130. 
19. Id. Even before President-elect Aristide took control of the government, a 
former Interior Minister in the Duvalier government attempted a bloodless coup d'etat. 
However, this attempt was squashed by military forces loyal to the newly elected 
government. 
20. Id. at 131-32. 
21. Catherine S. Manegold, Innocent Abroad: Jean-BertrandAristide,N. Y. TIMES, 
May 1, 1994, (Magazine), at 38. 
22. See AMERICAS WATCH & NATIONAL COALITION FOR HAITIAN REFUGEES, 
SILENCING A PEOPLE: THE DESTRUCTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN HAITI (1993) 
[hereinafter SILENCING A PEOPLE]. 
23. Id. at 1-7. 
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meaningful and organized coalition capable of operating the govem-
ment. 24 
II. UNITED STATES LAW AND POLICY 
United States foreign policy toward Haiti during the 1980s and 1990s 
has been largely focused on stemming the flow of refugees and fostering 
democracy. During the neo-Duvalierist period, after the Clinton 
administration took office, the United States worked with the Organiza-
tion of American States and the United Nations to coerce the military 
rulers into relinquishing power.25 The primary diplomatic weapon was 
the imposition of economic sanctions.26 Economic sanctions were 
24. Id at 3-6. A basic tool used by the military and its supporters to further its 
assault on civil society was to bar all public meetings. This included activities such as 
church prayer meetings, peasant cooperatives, and political gatherings. Reports of 
warrantless arrests, short term detentions, and demanding payments to avoid detention 
or torture were common. Id. at 56. Of particular importance to the military and their 
supporters was the progressive wing of the Roman Catholic Church in Haiti. This part 
of the Roman Catholic Church preaches liberation theology, and from its ranks came 
Father Aristide. It has been noted that the Roman Catholic hierarchy is generally not 
sympathetic to the Ti Legliz (or Little Church as it is known in Haiti) movement, 
however, there are some bishops who have spoken against the human rights abuses 
committed by the Haitian military and their supporters. The Ti Legliz maintains an 
underground network which is considered one of the few resistance movements capable 
of challenging complete control of the de facto authorities over the Haitian population. 
The Roman Catholic Church is perhaps the only viable national institution apart from the 
military in Haiti-thus the military's traditional suspicion against the Roman Catholic 
Church in general and persecution against its more radical liberation theology adherents 
in particular. See Larry Rohter, Liberal Wing of Haiti's Catholic Church Resists 
Military, N. Y. DMES, July 24, 1994, at A3 . 
25. The United Nations has created a mission in Haiti (UNMIH), which was 
headed by Special Representative Dante Caputo. The UNMIH has been extended several 
times, and is especially important because it authorizes 700 military personnel, 567 
police monitors, 99 international and 271 local staff to restructure elements of Haiti's 
national law enforcement authorities. Such restructuring would take place after the 
present rulers step down and democracy is again attempted. While the United Nations 
Security Council has passed several resolutions concerning the Haitian situation, perhaps 
the most important resolution authorizes military and pohce training during the time of 
reconstruction. See S.C. Res. 867, U.N. SCOR, 3282nd Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/867 
(1993). 
26. The Organization of American States imposed economic sanctions on Haiti in 
November 1991. The embargo does not cover basic needs such as food and medicine. 
In February 1992, the United States lifted the embargo for Haitian exports of goods 
coming from American-owned assembly plants. In May 1993, the United Nations 
Security Council imposed an oil and weapons embargo, and in May 1994, it tightened 
the sanctions by freezing the assets and revoking travel visas of the military and coup 
d'etat leaders. See Julia Preston, UN. Widens Sanctions Against Haiti, US.-Initiated 
Moves Directed at Generals, WASH. POST, May 7, 1994, at AI. Commentators have 
noted that the military leaders and their supporters circumvented the embargo through 
various methods, including the use ofnon-OAS ships to transport goods into the country, 
allowing airplanes to land at the international airport at night, and most importantly, 
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intended to foster discontent among Haitian business interests that 
supported the military. Without imported goods, discontent would 
eventually erupt, forcing the de facto rulers to negotiate for the 
establishment of democracy and the return of President Aristide. Had 
the economic embargo failed to remove the de facto rulers, there was 
always the possibility of using military force. This option was initially 
resisted by United States military leaders and publicly opposed by 
certain Latin American countries, including the Dominican Republic.27 
The notion of using force to restore democracy and President Aristide 
to power also ran into difficulty in Congress, where it re-ignited a long-
standing dispute between the executive branch and Congress over the 
using the land border with the Dominican Republic to bring goods, especially gasoline, 
into the country. President Aristide and his supporters in Haiti supported international 
economic sanctions. See Claudette Antoine Werleigh, Haiti and the Halfhearted, BULL. 
ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Nov. 1993, at 20, 22-23 (Ms. Werleigh is the Foreign Affairs 
Minister appointed by President Aristide). Those opposed to sanctions express the 
opinion that sanctions only serve to impose hardship on the already poor Haitian 
civilians. Sanctions pose a moral dilemma because they mostly harm those who are not 
responsible for the wrongdoing and are the least able to bring about a change in the 
political situation. See Drew Christiansen & Gerard Powers, Unintended Consequences, 
BULL ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Nov. 1993, at 41-44. For a general discussion on internation-
al economic sanctions see, BARRY E. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: 
IMPROVING THE HAPHAZARD U.S. LEGAL REGIME (1988); see also UNITED STATES 
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: EFFECTIVENESS As TOOLS OF 
FOREIGN POLICY (1992) (Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. 
Senate). 
27. See Carroll J. Doherty, President Broadly Criticized For Talk of Military 
Action, 52 CONG. Q. 1134, 1135 (May 7, 1994); Howard W. French, Hands Off Haiti, 
Dominicans Say, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1994, at A9; Howard W. French, US. Hint of 
Force to End Haiti Crisis Draws Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1994, at A3; John 
M. Goshko, U.S. Relying on Tough Haiti Sanctions-for Now, WASH. POST, June 9, 1994, 
at Al4 (detailing the testimony of William Gray, special Haiti adviser to President 
Clinton, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee; many committee members 
expressed concern that the administration policy would invariably lead to armed interven-
tion); Daniel Williams, U.S. Proposes Peacekeepers/or Haiti, Tentative Plan Aimed at 
Safeguarding Return of President Aristide, WASH. POST, May l 0, 1994, at A3 
("President Clinton has said he does not rule out the use of military forces to remove ... 
Haitian leaders .... The Pentagon is wary of military involvement."). See generally 
Alex de Waal & Rakiya Omarr, Can MilitarylnterventionBe "Humanitarian"?, MIDDLE 
E. REP., Mar.-June 1994, at 3-9 (discussing the use of military force to achieve 
humanitarian goals; such humanitarian intervention is "fraught with problems" and 
should be subject to strict preconditions that have not been practiced). 
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constitutional role of the Legislature in United States military actions 
abroad.28 
The extent to which the United States was willing to publicly 
condemn human rights abuses in Haiti during most of the 1980s and 
1990s has been influenced by Haiti's strategic location next to Cuba, and 
more importantly, by the United States' attempt to stem the flow of 
refugees.29 This policy dates back to the Reagan administration and 
has continued throughout the Bush and Clinton administrations. During 
this period the United States domestic and foreign policy regarding 
Haitian boatpeople and refugees has had three objectives: (1) to exclude, 
detain, and restrict the use of parole for Haitians physically present in 
the United States, (2) to interdict Haitians on the high seas, and (3) to 
process Haitian refugees in their own country. 
A. Exclusion, Detention, and Restrictive Parole 
The field of immigration experienced two important events in 1980. 
First, the Refugee Act of 1980 was enacted by Congress.30 The 
Refugee Act amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the 
basic statute governing immigration affairs, in a variety of ways.31 The 
Refugee Act amended the INA by including a universal definition of 
refugee.32 The Refugee Act also added two new sections: INA sections 
207 and 208. Section 207 covers overseas and emergency refugee 
28. Ruth Marcus, Administrator Is Challenged on Issue of Haiti Invasion Vote, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1994, at A14. 
29. SILENCING A PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 125-28 (discussing U.S. policy in Haiti 
regarding human rights). 
30. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). 
31. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1994). 
32. 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(1993) reads: 
(A) [A]ny person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, 
in the case of a person having no nationality is outside any country in which 
such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return 
to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, 
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on 
account ofrace, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, 
or political opinion, or (B) in such circumstances as the President after 
appropriate consultation (as defined in section 1157( e) of this title may specify, 
any person who is within the country of such person's nationality or, in the 
case of a person having no nationality, within the country in which such person 
is habitually residing, and who is persecuted or who has a well-founded fear 
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion. The term "refugee" does not 
include any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in 
the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1993). 
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admissions, while section 208 provides asylum procedures for refugees 
who are physically present in the United States, or at a port of entry or 
land border. 33 
Further, the Refugee Act amended INA se.ction 243(h) to allow 
refugees to request withholding of deportation ( or nonrefoulement) 
during exclusion proceedings.34 With the Refugee Act, the United 
States aligned its domestic law with international obligations it incurred 
by signing the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which 
incorporated by reference the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees. 35 
The second major event in the field of immigration during 1980 was 
the massive influx of Cuban refugees who were allowed to leave Cuba 
through the port of Mariel. The Mariel Cubans numbered more than 
100,000.36 Along with the Cubans, more than 1000 Haitians entered 
the United States each month during this same period. 37 The Cubans, 
unlike the Haitians, were protected by special legislation that allowed 
them to stay in the country. Responding to foreign policy concerns 
toward the communist regime in Cuba, Congress had enacted legislation 
33. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157, 1158 (1994). Refugee determination is intended to be made 
on a case-by-case basis. See generally Carlos Ortiz Miranda, Toward a Broader 
Definition of Refugee: 20th Century Development Trends, 20 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 315 
(1990). However, this has not always been the situation. See generally THOMAS A. 
ALEINKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 745-59 (3d ed. 1995) (citing 
instances in which case-by-case refugee determinations were not applied by the United 
States government in overseas refugee processing as a matter of administrative and 
legislative policy). 
34. Refugee Act§ 203(e) made the following amendment: "The Attorney General 
shall not deport or return any alien ... to a country if the Attorney General determines 
that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, sec. 203(e}, § 243(h), 94 Stat. 102 (1980) 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(l) (1982)). 
35. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed January 31, I 967 (entered 
into force October 4, 1967), 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force for 
the United States November 1, 1968), reprinted in INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 
110.1 (R. Lillich ed., 1986) [hereinafter 1967 or UN Protocol]; see also I.N.S. v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,436-40 (1987) (discussingthe Refugee Act as it relates 
to the 1967 Protocol). 
36. See CHARLES GoRDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE, 
§ 64.01[2][b] (rev. ed. 1993). 
37. See THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS 
AND POLICY 294 (1985). Since the 1970s, Haitians had been coming to the United 
States in small boats, and many of them applied for political asylum upon coming into 
contact with the INS. Id 
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in 1966 authorizing the Attorney General to grant permanent resident 
status to any native or citizen of Cuba who was admitted or paroled into 
the United States after January 1, 1959, and had been physically present 
in the United States for at least one year.38 This special treatment 
resulted in charges of unfair and discriminatory treatment by the U.S. 
against Cuba's neighbors, the Haitians. 
In 1981, President Reagan responded to the influx of Cubans and 
Haitians by changing the immigration parole policy on excludable 
aliens.39 Rather than paroling excludable aliens into the community, 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) detained them pending 
exclusion hearings, particularly those without documents.40 As a result 
of this new parole policy, Haitian refugees who had reached the U.S. 
shores or "threshold of entry" were subjected to exclusion proceedings 
and incarceration.41 Furthermore, this restrictive parole policy prompt-
ed litigation on behalf of Haitian asylum-seekers. 
38. Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966); see 
also GORDON ET AL., supra note 36, § 34.04[5][a]. 
39. Only those aliens who were deemed a national security risk or were likely to 
abscond were kept in detention. While the Refugee Act created new mechanisms for 
admitting refugees and expressly prohibited the use of the parole power for that purpose, 
the overwhelming number of Cubans and Haitians reaching the United States in 1980 
forced President Carter, after consulting with Congress, to use the parole power to admit 
Cuban and Haitian refugees. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 36, at§ 33.01[4]; see also 
S. REP. No. 96-256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1979) ("Once the bill [Refugee Act] takes 
effect ... the Attorney General does not anticipate using this [parole] authority ... 
unless he determines that compelling reasons in the public interest ... require that they 
be paroled into the United States, rather than be admitted in accordance with proposed 
Sections 207 or 208."). The Cuban and Haitian refugees were granted special parole 
status for fixed periods of time known as "Cuban-Haitian (Status Pending)." For a 
discussion on parole in the exclusion context see GoRDON ET AL., supra note 36, at 
§ 63.05[3]. Congress later authorized the allocation of monies to assist in resettling this 
special category ofrefugees and the Secretary of Human Services was charged with the 
responsibility to administer the program. In 1986, Congress authorized the adjustment 
of status to permanent residency for eligible "Cuban-Haitian (Status Pending)" entrants. 
See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 202, l 00 Stat. 
3359, 3404 (1986). 
40. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 37, at 294. SeegenerallyGORDON ET AL., 
supra note 36, §§ 65.01-65.15 ( explaining exclusion proceedings). The Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, the federal agency with primary responsibility over the 
administration and enforcement ofimmigration laws, is part of the Department of Justice. 
Its governmental regulations are found in 8 Code of Federal Regulations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1-
499. l (1995). 
41. "Entry" means "any coming of an alien into the United States, from a foreign 
port or place or from an outlying possession," when that alien "reaches any land, water 
or air space within the territorial limits" of the United States. An "entry" is made only 
when an alien is on United States soil and is free from official restraint. See GoRDAN ET 
AL., supra note 36, § 71.03[6]. 
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1. Court Challenges: The Jean Litigation 
Louis v. Nelson,42 while not the first class action filed on behalf of 
Haitian asylum seekers during the 1980s, 43 was the first class action on 
behalf of Haitians who arrived in Florida on or after May 21, 1981, and 
were detained without parole. The Louis plaintiffs were held at several 
INS facilities until their asylum applications were decided pursuant to 
the restrictive policy change made by the Reagan administration.44 The 
issue before the Louis court was whether an excludable alien can be 
incarcerated during the pendency, and possible appeal, of a claim for 
admission into the country.45 The Haitian plaintiffs challenged their 
detention on two grounds. First, they claimed that the INS did not 
comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provisions on 
notice and comment in adopting the new practice of incarcerating aliens 
who could not show prima facie eligibility for admission to the coun-
try.46 Second, they asserted that the detention policy was illegal 
because it unconstitutionally discriminated against Haitians on its face, 
or alternatively, in its application.47 The distr.ict court held that the 
detention policy was not applied in a discriminatory manner, but further 
42. 544 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Fla. 1982). 
43. On May 9, 1979, a class action was filed on behalf of more than 4,000 Haitians 
who had sought political asylum in South Florida. The basic thrust of the complaint was 
that the INS had instituted a program "to achieve mass deportation of Haitian nationals." 
Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 457 (S.D. Fla. 1980). The district 
court, in its 90-page decision, ordered the INS to submit a detailed plan for an "orderly, 
case-by-case, nondiscriminatory and procedurally fair" asylum application processing. 
Id at 532. This included a full administrative record that could serve as the basis for 
meaningful judicial review. Id The case was appealed by the government which 
challenged the district court's jurisdiction over the subject-matter, its constitutional 
finding that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment were 
violated by the INS program, judicial notice of the country conditions in Haiti, and the 
burden of proof on asylum applicants. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's 
decision with some modifications. See Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 
1027 (5th Cir. 1982). 
44. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Fla. 1982). 
45. Id. at 976. The case begins with a quote from Carl Sandburg: 
Life is like an onion; 
you peel off one layer at a time, 
and sometimes you weep. 
Id. at 975. 
46. Id. ·at 984. 
47. Id 
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held that the INS failed to comply with the APA and ordered the 
detained class members released. 48 
An appeal and cross-appeal of Louis v. Nelson (Jean I) followed the 
district court's ruling.49 In the lengthy opinion, the court of appeals 
concluded that the government had failed to define the scope of the 
changed parole policy, thus notice and comment rulemaking were 
required. The court of appeals reversed the district court's finding on 
the question of discrimination and held that the ultimate result was the 
same because the Haitians had been impermissibly denied parole.50 
During the course of litigation, the INS complied with APA notice and 
comment requirements by promulgating regulations that were facially 
neutral in the treatment of Haitians, because the regulations forbade 
consideration of race and nationality in parole determinations. These 
INS actions rendered the APA question moot.51 
A petition for rehearing and rehearing en bane was granted (Jean 
/l).52 The central issue before the appellate court in Jean v. Nelson 
(Jean Ill) was whether the plaintiffs could avail themselves of the Fifth 
Amendment's equal protection guarantee to challenge the "government's 
refusal to grant them parole."53 Before it answered that question 
though, the court of appeals discussed the federal government's plenary 
power as a sovereign nation to control the admission of aliens.54 
Paramount to the court of appeals decision was the case of United States 
v. Curtiss-Wright in which the Supreme Court postulated: "The 
investment of federal government with the powers of external sovereign-
ty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. "55 
With this jurisprudential introduction, the appeals court discussed the 
constitutional rights of Haitians in view of the "entry" doctrine. 
According to the court, the Haitians had not technically or legally 
entered the country, but were incarcerated pending a determination of 
their admissibility, or actual entry, as asylees.56 As such, they had no 
equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment to challenge the 
government's parole discretion. Although the President and the Attorney 
General had the power "to draw distinctions between classes of aliens," 
48. Id. at I 002-04. 
49. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983). 
50. Id. at 1509. 
51. See 47 Fed. Reg. 30,044 (1982), amended by 47 Fed. Reg. 46,494 (1982); see 
also Jean, 711 F.2d at 1502. 
52. Jean v. Nelson, 714 F.2d 96 (11th Cir. 1983) (granting rehearing en bane) 
53. 727 F.2d 957, 962 (1984) (en bane). 
54. Id. at 964. 
55. Id. ( citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)). 
56. Id. at 967-69. 
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lower level INS officials had no such power and could only follow the 
policies established in Washington, D.C.57 Moreover, regarding the 
larger issue of the authority to deny parole to unadmitted aliens, the 
court of appeals stated that immigration officials clearly have that 
authority if they have a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" for 
their decision. 58 The case· was remanded on this question. 59 
The Jean III decision was appealed to the Supreme Court and was 
granted certiorari. This was the first time the Supreme Court had 
addressed the federal government's handling of Haitian refugees during 
the 1980s.60 The Supreme Court, in what has been named Jean IV, 
was quick to reprimand the court of appeals for considering the 
constitutional question, since the case could have been decided on 
statutory and regulatory grounds. 61 As a matter of judicial restraint, 
constitutional adjudication by the federal courts should not occur unless 
it is unavoidable. 62 Therefore, leaving the constitutional question aside, 
the Supreme Court affirmed the decision to remand the case to the 
district court, compelling the district court to consider whether the INS 
officials exercised proper parole power in making individual determina-
tions and whether such determinations were made ''without regard to 
race or national origin. 63
The dissent in Jean IV felt that the constitutional question could not 
be avoided.64 The dissent argued that the majority's reasoning was 
flawed because the majority had incorrectly relied on the parole statute 
and regulations promulgated in the course of litigation as the means 
57. Id at 984. 
58. Id at 977 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972)). The 
Kleindienst decision is the leading Supreme Court case on First Amendment challenges 
to alien exclusion. See Carlos Ortiz Miranda, Rethinking the Role of Politics in United 
States Immigration Law: The Helsinki Accords and Ideological Exclusion of Aliens, 25 
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 301, 313-14 (1988). 
59. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 984 (1984). 
60. Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985). 
61. Id at 854. 
62. Id (citing Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99 (1981); Three Affiliated 
Tribes of Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138 (1984); Kolender v. 
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 n.10 (1983); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 257 (1982) 
(Stevens, J., concurring)); Mobile v. Bolder, 446 U.S. 55, 60 (1980); United States v. 
Gerloch Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 737 (1950). 
63. Jean, 727 F.2d at 857. 
64. Id at 858 (Marshall, J., Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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through which the Haitians could seek relief. 65 The dissent found the 
regulations flawed in three respects. First, the regulations contained a 
catch-all category which allowed continued detention in the public 
interest as determined by the INS District Director.66 The regulations, 
however, did not define what the "public interest" was.67 Second, there 
was no prohibition on considering national origin in the parole statute. 
This was essentially left to the District Directors.68 Finally, the 
presumption that the regulations were neutral as to race and national 
origin was misplaced. Such a presumption simply was not supported. 
An authoritative statement by the Attorney General or the INS that the 
parole statute and regulations prohibit classifications on account of race 
and national origin did not exist. 69 
The dissent then turned to the constitutional inquiry and, after 
considerable analysis of procedural due process, found that the court of 
appeals should have remanded the case to determine the scope of 
petitioned equal protection rights. 70 It is interesting to note that the 
dissent found that national-origin classifications have a strong constitu-
tional claim when they are used in decisions that lie "at the heart of' 
immigration policy.71 
The Jean line of cases regarding Haitian asylum-seekers reiterate the 
legal principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in the 1950s: 
unadmitted aliens (subject to exclusion proceedings, detention, and 
parole) are on the "threshold of initial entry."72 As such, they are not 
entitled to constitutional guarantees, and are limited to whatever 
procedures the Attorney General establishes in her discretion.73 
65. Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 857. On remand, the district court had to 
consider if INS officials properly made individualized determination of parole, and if 
INS officials exercised their discretion under the law and regulation without regard to 
race or national origin. Id 
66. Id at 861. 
67. Id 
68. Id 
69. Id at 865. 
70. Id at 882. 
71. Id at 871. At the conclusion of the underlying litigation, there was further 
federal court activity concerning the award of attorneys' fees granted to the attorneys 
representing the Haitians as the prevailing party under the Equal Access to Justice Act. 
See Louis v. Nelson, 646 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759 
(11th Cir. 1988), afj'd, INS v. Marie Lucie Jean, 469 U.S. 154 (1990). In addition, 
Haitian refugees detained upon arrival in the country between 1981-1982 brought an 
unlawful detention tort and civil rights action against .INS agents who had incarcerated 
them. Adras v. Nelson, 917 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1990). These claim were not 
successful. Id 
72. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958) (quoting Shaughnessy 
v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953)). 
73. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953). 
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However, that discretion is not unfettered. The Attorney General must 
comply with relevant statutes such as the Refugee Act and the INA, as 
well as implementing regulations that may fall within the purview of the 
APA. The same holds true for applicable case law handed down by the 
federal· courts. 
2. Maritime Jurisdiction and Exclusion Proceedings 
The treatment of Haitian asylum-seekers who have been apprehended 
in territorial waters, as opposed to having actually reached a land border 
or a port of entry of the United States, has also provoked a certain 
amount of discussion. Unlike the situation with detained aliens and the 
INS 's parole policy, there has not yet been any federal court activity on 
the treatment of Haitian asylum-seekers apprehended in the territorial 
waters of the United States. Case law discussed above makes it clear 
that Haitian asylum-seekers who land in the United States and request 
asylum are subject to exclusion proceedings. These Haitians are on the 
threshold of initial entry and the federal government's immigration 
policy has been. to incarcerate them during pending exclusion proceed-
ings, during which they may assert a claim to asylum or withholding of 
deportation (nonrefoulement). 74 The question has been raised, and not 
definitively answered by federal courts, whether aliens intercepted within 
the territorial sea of the United States are afforded exclusion proceed-
ings. 75 
In 1988 President Reagan extended the territorial sea of the United 
States by presidential proclamation to twelve nautical miles. 76 The new 
territorial sea limit was a response to international practice codified by 
74. See supra notes 32-35.and accompanying text. 
75. This situation applies to Haitians and other nationalities, particularly the 
Chinese, who have been apprehended by the Coast Guard in increasing numbers during 
recent years. See No Exclusion Hearings for Interdicted Aliens, Justice Department 
Legal Counsel Says, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 381 (1994) [hereinafter No Exclusion 
Hearings]. 
76. The Presidential Proclamation defines the territorial sea as: 
The territorial sea of the Unites States is a maritime zone extending beyond the 
land territory and internal waters of the United States over which the United 
States exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction, a sovereignty and jurisdiction that 
extend to the airspace over the territorial sea, as well as its bed and subsoil. 
Proclamation No. 5928, 3 C.F.R. 547 (1988). 
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the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.77 The INS implemented 
the change in the extension of the territorial sea in 1992.78 On October 
13, 1993, legal counsel for the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a 
memorandum concluding that no exclusion hearings need be given to 
aliens interdicted in United States territorial waters.79 When the DOJ 
Memorandum came to this conclusion, it contradicted the position taken 
by the INS that the presidential proclamation extending territorial waters 
also had the effect of extending the scope of the INA, specifically the 
Refugee Act. 80 The DOJ Memorandum reached its opinion by examin-
ing the requirement for exclusion proceedings81 within the text of the 
77. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, I 982, part II, § 1, 
art. 2, U.N. Doc. AICONF. 62/122, reprintedin I INTERNATIONAL AND UNITED STATES 
DOCUMENTS ON OCEANS LAW AND POLICY 255 (1986) (John N. Moore ed., 1986). 
Article 2 provides: 
(l)"The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and 
internal waters and, in the case of an archpelagic State, its archipelagic waters, 
to an adjacent belt of sea described as the territorial sea." 
(3)"The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this Conven-
tion and to other rules of international law." 
Id Article 3 provides: 
Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a 
limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles measured from the baselines determined 
in accordance with this Convention 
Id § 2, art. 3. 
The United States resisted signing the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, in large 
part, because of a dispute over deep sea-bed mining. See JAMES K. SEBENIUS, 
NEGOTIATING TI!E LA w OF TheSEA 81-106 ( 1984). Following a decade of negotiations, 
the United States finally signed the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea on July 29, 
1994, but formal United States participation depends on Senate ratification. The treaty 
itself went into effect in November 1994. See Rebecca J. Fowler, Law of the Sea: An 
Odyssey to U.S. Acceptance, WASH. POST, July 29, 1994, at A3. 
78. See 57 Fed. Reg. 47,257 (Oct. 15, 1992), reprinted in 69 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 1385 (1992). The final rule amends 8 C.F.R. § 287.l;which now reads: 
(a)(l) External Boundary. The term external boundary, as used in section 
287(a)(3) of the Act, means the land boundaries and the territorial boundaries 
and the territorial sea of the United States extending 12 nautical miles from the 
baselines of the United States determined in accordance with international law. 
8 C.F.R. § 287.l(a){l) (1994). 
79. See Memorandum For the Attorney General, by Walter Dellinger, Acting 
Assistant Attorney General (Oct. 3, 1993) ( copy on file with author) [hereinafter DOJ 
Memorandum]. For a comprehensive digest of the memorandum, see No Exclusion 
Hearings, supra note 75, at 381-86. 
80. DOJ Memorandum, supra note 79, at 3. 
81. Id at 5-9. The DOJ Memorandum interprets INA sections 235(b) (jurisdiction-
al basis for exclusion proceedings) and 236(a) (providing for exclusion proceeding before 
an Immigration Judge) to require exclusion proceedings only to aliens who have arrived 
at a "port of arrival." Id This interpretation, according to the memorandum, is support-
ed by a federal district court decision, Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 
1396 (D.D.C. 1985). Gracey states that exclusion proceedings are statutorily created 
procedural rights which are limited to aliens who arrive at a port within the United 
States. See id; see also DOJ Memorandum, supra note 79, at 8. 
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INA and the Refugee Act's sections on asylum and withholding of 
deportation (nonrefoulement).82 Further, the DOJ Memorandum 
analyzed the definition of the United States in the INA, 83 and that the 
presidential proclamation itself did not provide additional procedural 
entitlements to undocumented aliens interdicted within the territorial 
waters of the United States. 84 The DOJ Memorandum cited various 
cases to support its position, but no federal case has explicitly decided 
the question.85 . . 
A careful reading of Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 86 the Supreme 
Court case that decided the INA's nonextraterritorial application of the 
mandatory INA requirement of nonrefoulement, provides interesting 
references to exclusion proceedings and maritime jurisdiction. The issue 
before the Supreme Court, in its own terminology, was "whether ... 
forced repatriation, authorized to be taken beyond the Territorial Sea of 
the United States," violates 243(h)(l), or Article 33 of the Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees· (the nonrefoulement provision).87 
These are actions on the high seas, not the territorial sea, as expressed 
by the Court's phrasing of the issue.88 First, the Supreme Court made 
it clear that the INA's provision extending to nonrefoulement applies to 
exclusion proceedings. 89 Second, exclusion proceedings are domestic 
82. DOJ Memorandum, supra note 79, at 9-15. INA § 208 stipulates that the 
Attorney General has to provide asylum procedures to aliens "physically present in the 
United States or at a land border or port of entry." INA§ 208, U.S.C. § 1185 (1988). 
INA§ 243(h) requires the Attorney General to withhold deportation ifan alien's life or 
freedom would be threatened as a refugee. INA§ 243, 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (1988). Here, 
the requirement obligates the Attorney General, not the President's directive to the Coast 
Guard, according to the DOJ Memorandum. DOJ Memorandum, supra note 79. 
83. DOJ Memorandum, supra note 79, at 20. The INA does not specifically 
mention the territorial sea as being part of the United States; it only includes the 
continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. 
84. Id at 20-23. 
85. Id at 15. 
86. 113 s. Ct. 2549 (1993). 
87. Id at 2552 (emphasis added). The Court stressed that this language appears 
in the executive orders by both Presidents Reagan and Bush. Id at 2552 n. I. 
88. Id at 2552. 
89. See id at 2560; see also DOJ Memorandum, supra note 79 (quoting Haitian 
Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1510 (11th Cir. 1992)): 
[T]he plaintiffs in this case - who have been interdicted on the high seas . . . 
cannot assert a claim based on the INA or the Refugee Act . . . . The plain 
language of the statute is unambiguous and limits the application of the provi-
sion to aliens within the United States or at United States' borders or ports of 
entry . . . . The plaintiffs in this case have been interdicted on the high seas 
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procedures used by the Attorney General to determine whether a 
nonadmitted alien will remain in the United States.90 Third, the Court 
found that although the nonrefoulement provisions did not apply to 
exclusion proceedings before the 1980 Refugee Act, the INA did offer 
some protection to excludable aliens.91 The Court went on to· state that 
the INA offered no such protection to any alien who was beyond the 
territorial waters of the United States, and it would not expect the 
federal government to assume the burden of protecting aliens beyond the 
territorial sea without some acknowledgement of its dramatically 
broadened scope. 92 
The Sale Court's decision implies that the protection offered by 
domestic law to refugees · before 1980 did not encompass the right to 
request nonrefoulement in exclusion proceedings, although aa certain 
degree of protection did exist. After 1980, refugees could avail 
themselves of nonrefoulement in exclusion proceedings. In either event, 
both pre-1980 and post-1980 law did not apply extraterritorially as 
defined by the Court to mean beyond the territorial waters of the United 
States. 
The Supreme Court went on to state that no published consideration 
existed to the effect that the United States was assuming any extraterrito-
rial obligations by its accession to the 1967 Protocol. No nation could 
invoke Article 33(1) jurisdiction under Article 33(2)'s stipulation that 
nonrefoulement need not be extended to those who are "a danger to the 
security of the country in which he is" because "an alien intercepted on 
the high seas is in no country at all."93 Toward the end of its· opinion 
the Court again made direct reference to the territorial sea of the United 
States: "[W]hile we must, of course, be guided by the high purpose of 
both the treaty [1967 Convention] and the statute [INA-Refugee Act], we 
are not persuaded that either one places any limit on the President's 
authority to repatriate aliens interdicted beyond the territorial seas of the 
United States. "94 
and have not yet reached "a land border" or a "port of entry.''. 
Id 
Also cited was the Sale case for the proposition that INA' s protections apply only to 
those aliens who reside in or have arrived at the border of the country. See DOJ 
Memorandum, supra note 79, at 10. 
90. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2552. 
91. Id at 2561; see id at 256l n.33 (citing H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 30 (1979)); S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1979), reprintedin 1979 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 157 (expressing clear congressional intent that withholding of 
deportation applies to aliens in both deportation and exclusion proceedings). 
92. Sale,• 113 S. Ct. at 2562. 
93. Id at 2563. 
94. Id at 2567. 
690 
[VOL. 32: 673, 1995] Haiti and The United States 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Given the holding in Sale, a valid argument can be made in analyzing 
the above text that the 1967 Protocol, and especially the INA, impose 
limits on the President's authority (and by extension the Attorney 
General, the INS, and the Coast Guard) to repatriate aliens interdicted 
within the territorial sea of the United States. At the very least, 
nonrefoulement applies. It is logical also to conclude that the federal 
government's recourse in handling refugees in the territorial waters of 
the United States is either to tow the interdicted vessel to a land border 
or port of entry for exclusion proceedings, or to tum the vessel away to 
a third country, but not to the country of origin if the refugees qualify 
for either asylum or withholding of deportation.95 
On April 23, 1994, approximately six months after the DOJ Memoran-
dum was written, a boat loaded with more than 400 Haitians was inter-
cepted within the United States' territorial sea.96 The United States 
response was to bring the vessel to shore and process the Haitians at the 
Krome detention center located in Florida. These actions made the 
United States the country of first asylum for the Haitian refugees.97 
Some Haitians were ultimately paroled into the community, while others 
were put into criminal facilities. 98 More importantly, President Clinton 
stated two reasons for allowing the Haitians to be brought on shore: (1) 
there.was evidence that they were being abused, and (2) "[t]hese people 
were only four miles from the shore."99 Once on land, the Haitians 
were allowed to make asylum and withholding of deportation claims 
before the INS. If they were not found eligible, they then had an 
95. See id. at 2563. 
96. Id. at 2567. 
97. A country of first asylum is one where the refugee comes into contact with 
authorities and requests protection. Principles of first asylum would not apply if a 
refugee has been firmly resettled elsewhere, or has come into contact with an 
intermediate country in which the refugee does not request state protection. There is no 
agreement between states on responsibilities over first asylum. The United States does 
not grant protection to refugees who have been firmly resettled before entering the 
country. See INA § 207(c)(l), 8 U.S.C. § l 157(c) (1994). In addition, the Supreme 
Court has held that a person seeking refuge in the United States must be "reasonably 
proximate to the flight and not following a flight remote in point of time or intervening 
residence in a third country reasonably constituting a termination of the original flight 
in search ofrefuge." Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49, 57 (1971); see also 
GUY s. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LA w 52-56 (1983) ( discussing 
the principle of first asylum). 
98. William Booth, 400 Haitians Intercepted, Held in Florida; Clinton Calls Case 
Unique, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1994, at A3. 
99. Id. (emphasis added). 
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opportunity to make those claims de novo in exclusion proceedings 
while the United States sought to remove them from the country. 100 
Under international law the coastal state has unrestricted jurisdiction 
over its territorial sea. However, the extent to which the state chooses 
to exercise that jurisdiction depends on its particular domestic legisla-
tion.101 President Clinton's statement is a strong-indication that there 
is an obligation to provide a "safe harbor" to aliens who are apprehended 
within the territorial sea of the United States. The next question then is 
whether the United States will follow through on the conclusions 
postulated in the DOJ Memorandum or whether Congress will ultimately 
legislate in this area. 
B. The Interdiction Program and the Interdiction Cases 
The interdiction program is the second component of the United States 
policy regarding the migration of undocumented aliens into the 
southeastern part of the country, the first component being the restrictive 
parole policy discussed earlier. Much commentary has been written 
about the interdiction program. 102 It has also been the subject of a 
series of cases in the federal judiciary. 103 This section will briefly 
100. The federal government decided to parole most Haitians into the community, 
however, the INS imposed the requirement that they must report to those nongovernmen-
tal agencies that assist in finding sponsors for Haitian refugees until their cases are 
adjudicated. Given the backlog of asylum adjudications, the Haitians could be required 
to report for several years. The reporting requirement caused a controversy because no 
other refugee group is subject to it. Some nongovernmental agencies backed out of the 
arrangement with the INS to resettle the refugees. Singling out Haitians for the reporting 
requirement brought about renewed charges of racism against the government. Others 
felt that the requirement was to appease the state political establishment in Florida that 
had been upset at the cost that refugees and other aliens cause state and local 
instrumentalities. See CWS Objects to Special Release Conditions Put on 350 Haitians, 
NEWS RELEASE (Church World Service), May 11, 1994 (Church World Service (CWS) 
is a joint voluntary agency which participates in refugee resettlement) (copy on file with 
author). 
101. See MALCOM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 350 (1991) (discussing the 
juridical nature of the territorial sea). 
102. See generally Arthur C. Helton, The United States Government Program of 
Intercepting and Forcibly Returning Haitian Boatpeople to Haiti: Policy Implications 
and Prospects, IO N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 325 (1993); Stephen H. Legomsky, The 
Haitian Interdiction Programme, Human Rights, and the Role of Judicial Protection, 2 
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 181 (1990); Symposium, The Haitian Refugee Crisis: A Closer 
Look, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 1-147 (1993); Symposium, Refugee Law and Policy, 33 
VA. J. INT'L L. 473-526 (1993). 
103. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396 (D.D.C. 
1985); Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Haitian 
Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 789 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1991); Haitian Refugee Ctr., 
Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated as moot sub nom. Sale v. Haitian 
Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. 3028 (1993). 
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discuss the interdiction program and the fate of repatriated Haitians, 
while concentrating on the line of cases from the mid-1980s to the 1993 
Supreme Court decision challenging the validity of various aspects of 
that program. 
1. Bilateral Agreement with Haiti and Presidential Declaration 
On September 23, 1981, the United States and the Republic of Haiti, 
through an exchange of diplomatic letters, entered into an agreement 
authorizing the Coast Guard to intercept Haitian vessels on the high 
seas. 104 Coast Guard personnel were authorized to board intercepted 
vessels under the agreement to ascertain if they contain undocumented 
aliens and, if so, return the vessel with its crew and passengers to 
Haiti. 105 
Intercepted Haitians were to be repatriated forcibly; however, the 
Haitian government would not punish its repatriated citizens for their 
illegal departure. For its part, the United States would not repatriate any 
passengers whom the United States authorities determined to qualify for 
refugee status. 106 During the early 1980s, the INS guidelines imple-
menting the interdiction program required that interviews be held on the 
Coast Guard cutters. Only those Haitians with plausible asylum claims 
would be transported to the .United States and allowed to apply for 
asylum. 107 On September 29, 1981, President Reagan issued a presi-
dential proclamation suspending the entry of undocumented aliens from 
the high seas into the United States and ordering the Coast Guard to 
intercept vessels suspected of carrying undocumented aliens and return 
them to their point of origin. The executive order prohibited the return 
of refugees without their consent. 108 
104. Agreement on Migrants-Interdiction, Sept. 23, 1981, United States-Haiti, 33 
U.S.T. 3559, T.I.A.S. No. 10241. 
105. For a detailed description of the program, see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, 
IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 970 (I 992). 
106. Id. 
107. Id; see also LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REFUGEE 
REFOULEMENT: THE FORCED RETURN OF HAITIANS UNDER THE U.S. HAITIAN 
INTERDICTION AGREEMENT (1990) [hereinafter LAWYERS COMM. REPORT]. 
108. Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,107, 48,109 (1981), reprinted in 8 
GORDON ET AL., supra note 36, at 454-55. 
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During the first ten years of the interdiction program, 364 vessels were 
intercepted and 21,000 Haitians were returned to Haiti. '09 Only six 
Haitians were transported to the United States and allowed to file asylum 
applications. 110 Some commentators have noted that the primary 
objective of the interdiction program has been to prevent Haitians from 
obtaining certain procedural rights, especially the right to a formal 
evidentiary exclusion hearing before an immigration judge. The 
interdiction program precludes their arrival to the United States and thus 
prevents Haitians from acquiring the statutory right to a formal hearing 
under the INA on any asylum or withholding of deportation claim. 111
If allowed into the United States, Haitian asylum seekers would have the 
right to a formal evidentiary proceeding represented by counsel before 
an immigration judge during exclusion proceedings, and the right to be 
represented by counsel in preparing the asylum application before the 
INS asylum corps. Legal representation is particularly important in the 
asylum context and is denied under the current procedure. 112 
109. LAWYERS COMM. REPORT, supra note 107, at 9. 
110. Legomsky, supra note 102, at 183. 
111. Id On October I, 1990, a complaint against the interdiction program was filed 
with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), which is part of the 
Organization of American States. The petition was filed by various organizations, 
located both in Haiti and the United States, and unnamed Haitian nationals who have 
been and are being returned to Haiti against their will. They allege that U.S. agents 
violate international law following "interdiction" of their vessels on the high seas by the 
United States Coast Guard. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, INTER-AMERICAN 
COMMISSION ON HUMAN. RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN 
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1993 334-35 (1994) [hereinafter IACHR REPORT]. 
On October 3, I 991, the petitioners submitted an Emergency Application for 
Provisional OAS Action to Halt the United States' Policy of Interdicting and Deporting 
Haitian Refugees. Id at 340. The petition alleged that the United States' interdiction 
policy denies Haitians an opportunity to present their claims for political asylum in a fair 
manner. In addition, the petition alleges that the United States is in violation of the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. Id at 340-41. 
On October 4, 1991, the IACHR sent a cablegram to then Secretary of State for the 
United States, James A. Baker, III, urging the United States to desist in its policy of 
interdicting and deporting Haitian refugees pending the current political climate in Haiti. 
The cablegram states in part, "[The IACHR urges that] for humanitarian reasons [the 
United States government] suspend its policy ofinterdiction of Haitian nationals who are 
attempting to seek asylum in the United States and are being sent back to Haiti, because 
of the danger to their lives, until the situation in Haiti has been normalized." Id at 341. 
112. See SARAH IGNATIUS, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ASYLUM PROCESS OF THE 
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 167-79 (1993) (National Asylum Study 
Project, Harvard Law School, Immigration and Refugee Program). This part of the 
assessment concludes: 
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Unrepresented [asylum] applicants suffer disproportionate harm compared to 
represented applicants from some of the shortcomings in asylum officers' 
work, such as hostile and aggressive manner of certain asylum officers in 
interviews; fundamental legal errors of certain asylum officers; difficulty of 
certain asylum officers in questioning applicants; and certain asylum officers' 
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In addition to precluding refugees from acquiring procedural 
rights upon reaching the United States, the interdiction program has also 
been criticized for ignoring the INS guidelines for conducting private 
hearings. 113 In fact, eye witnesses stated that some interviews took 
place in front of other passengers, while other interviews were conducted 
within hearing distance of passengers. 114 This was a serious failure in 
the refugee processing procedure given the sensitive nature of asylum 
claims. Another grievous problem with the on-board interviews was that 
they did not elicit facts needed to determine if the interviewee had a 
credible claim to asylum; 115 
The interdiction program was changed for approximately five months 
after the coup d'etat that toppled the Aristide regime. 116 This period 
saw an increase of Haitian boatpeople intercepted at sea and brought to 
Guantanamo Bay naval station in Cuba for processing. 117 Those 
lack of knowledge of country conditions. 
Id at 178. 
113. LEGOMSKY, supra note 105, at. 970. 
114. Id 
115. LAWYERS COMM. REPORT, supra note 107, at 6. 
116. On February 6, 1992, ·another petition was filed before the IACHR. The 
petitioning organizations filed an Emergency Application for Provisional OAS Action 
to Halt the United States Government's Policy of Returning Haitian Refugees Interdicted 
since the Military Coup of September 30, 1991. On March 11, 1993, the IACHR issued 
a declaration calling upon the governments of the hemisphere to take the emergency 
measures necessary to prevent the dangers and suffering experienced by those Haitians 
who, although forced to flee their country because of repression and persecution, have 
been or are being repatriated. The IACHR also requested that the United States govern-
ment review its interdiction policy of Haitians and ensure that Haitians residing in the 
United States be provided refuge. See generally IACHR REPORT, supra note 111, at 
341, 554. 
In its Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, the IACHR, under its recom-
mendations and conclusions, calls "upon member states to comply with their obligations 
under international conventions and instruments, including the American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man, [sic] to ensure that persons who flee their countries from 
political persecution are afforded the right to determine their claims for asylum or 
refugee status." ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STA1ES, INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN HAITI 152. 
(1994). 
117. Over 36,000 refugees were screened at Guantanamo Bay from November 1991 
to June 1993. Noted accomplishments of the refugee screening program include the fact 
that asylum officers assumed extra duties on an emergency basis, that the INS produced 
a memorandum on refugee and asylum law as well as the country conditions on Haiti 
to assist in the screening effort, and the asylum director at the Miami office worked 
closely with representatives of the Haitian applicants. Defects in the screening process 
included a wide disparity between asylum officers in screening Haitians into the United 
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Haitians with a credible claim to asylum were brought to the United 
States under parole status. 118 They were not incarcerated, but had to 
file their asylum applications with the INS. As parolees in the United 
States, refugees are afforded procedural remedies such as exclusion 
hearings should the INS deny their asylum applications. Refugee 
processing at Guantanamo Bay lasted approximately two years. The 
interdiction program was again changed in May 1992 through another 
executive order, known as the Kennebunkport Declaration. Under this 
order, intercepted vessels were returned immediately to Haiti without a 
hearing to establish plausible claims for asylum. 119 
The Kennebunkport Declaration superseded the original executive 
order which established the interdiction program in 1981.12° For ten 
years the United States had recognized, in theory, its international human 
rights obligation to protect refugees by not returning them to Haiti under 
either the bilateral agreement with Haiti or the ensuing Executive Order 
for the High Seas Interdiction of Illegal Aliens. The Kennebunkport 
Declaration changed that implicit recognition. However, the processing 
of refugees in the interdiction program was changed yet again in May 
1994. This policy reversal will be discussed below. 
States. Some asylum officers used the incorrect standard in requiring that Haitians 
demonstrate that they were being "singled out" for persecution, relying almost exclusive-
ly on Department of State materials and not enough on information provided by 
nongovernmental organizations. Another serious problem concerned the use of hand-
written notes by the asylum officers from the screening interviews to challenge the credi-
bility of the Haitian applicants during their asylum adjudication interviews before the 
INS. Nongovernmental organizations representing the Haitian applicants objected to this 
practice, especially because they did not have the opportunity to review the notes before 
the asylum hearing. The use of the prescreening notes "turned what should have been 
an impartial, nonadversarial hearing into a hostile credibility examination." See Letter 
from Emma Navajas, Chief Operating Officer, Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. 
to Rex Ford, Assoc. Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, and Ricardo 
Inzunza, Deputy Commissioner, INS (Aug. 24, 1992) ( copy on file with author); see also 
IGNATIUS, supra note 112, at 141-66 (chapter on the treatment of Haitian asylum cases). 
118. The INS has extended parole status and work authorization to those Haitians 
who were processed at Guantanamo Bay during the 1991 and early 1992 period. The 
re-parole was needed to allow the Haitians to pursue asylum applications. See INS 
Extends Parole, Work Authorization for Guantanamo Haitians, 71 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 835 (1994) (the extension was sent to all INS field offices on June 2, 1994, 
via cable (file CO 274a-P/208-P)). 
119. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 231,333 (1992), reprintedin 8 GORDON 
ET AL., supra note 36, at 474-76. 
120. Id § 4, reprinted in 8 GORDON ET AL., supra note 36, at 476 ("Executive 
Order 12324 is hereby revoked and replaced by this order."). 
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2. Fate of Repatriated Haitians 
Those Haitians who were prescreened into the United States to pursue 
their asylum applications before the Kennebunkport Declaration were 
indeed fortunate. Under the Kennebunkport order, the Coast Guard 
forcibly returned all Haitians back to their country, without screening 
boatpeople who might have had a credible fear of persecution. President 
Bush dismissed concern over the policy through assertions that 
repatriated boat people would not face persecution.121 This argument 
was plausible to the Bush administration because the majority of boat 
people were considered economic migrants. 122 To support its position, 
the administration relied on surveys conducted by the State Department 
and the INS in which approximately 2,500 repatriates were interviewed, 
and not one of those interviewed stated that he or she had been subject 
to persecution upon returning to Haiti. However, human rights monitors 
believe that such statements and surveys were clumsy attempts to 
rationalize and justify forced return. 123 The Bush administration also 
felt that they were protecting the safety of boatpeople who were leaving 
the country in "unseaworthy vessels without navigation equipment and 
life preservers."124 
The inquiries made by the United States government were conducted 
by individuals who did not have sufficient experience in refugee law, nor 
121. "I am convinced that the people in Haiti are not being physically oppressed. 
I would not want on my conscience that ... anyone that was fleeing oppression would 
be victimized upon return." President George Bush, May 28, 1992, quoted in Half the 
Story: The Skewed U.S. Monitoringof RepatriatedHaitianRefugees,AMERICAS WATCH, 
June 30, 1992, at 1-2 [hereinafter Half the Story]. 
122. Id This issue of Americas Watch is dedicated to critiquing the monitoring of 
repatriated Haitian refugees. The critique was based on three sets of documents: (1) 
several hundred pages of unclassified telegrams sent from the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-
Prince between mid-February and mid-May 1992; (2) the "Special Intelligence Report, 
Haiti" issued by the Department of Justice dated February 24, 1992; and (3) the "Haitian 
Situation Report," issued by the Department of Justice, INS, HQINT Dallas, Texas 
summarizing February and March visits by INS personnel. Id at 4-5. 
123. Id at 6. 
124. Letter from Lee M. Peters, Deputy Director, Office of the Caribbean, 
Department of State, to Don Hammond, Chairman, Committee on Migration, American 
Council for Voluntary International Action (Interaction) (June 26, 1992) (copy on file 
with author). 
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were they knowledgeable in the country conditions in Haiti. 125 Other 
serious problems with federal efforts to ascertain the fate of repatriated 
boatpeople included the fact that interviews were brief and conducted in 
semi-private conditions, and that the sample interviews were skewed 
because the government interviewed those who were more willing to go 
public, as opposed to those who were in hiding. 126 Human rights 
groups that focused closely on Haiti simply could not believe United 
States pronouncements on the safety of repatriates as reliable. 127 
Instead, they pointed to sworn statements of refugee advocates that 
painted a canvas of "renewed political repression, widespread violence, 
and the targeting of returned Haitians . . . by the security and paramili-
tary forces."128 
Reports of human rights abuses continued against the Haitian 
population supporting President Aristide. 129 The death toll rates during 
1993 are telling. During May and June only 14 deaths were report-
ed.130 Soon after the early July signing of the Governor's Island 
Agreement, 131 which was aimed at finding a political solution to the 
125. According to human rights advocates, those chosen to lead the INS teams were 
experts in detecting the smuggling of aliens and drugs, not in monitoring human rights 
abuses on the part of the Haitian authorities or their supporters. See Half the Story, 
supra note 121, at 6. 
126. Id. at 7-9. 
127. See Lawsuit Challenges Policy on 'Screened-In' Refugees, HAITI INSIGHT, 
May-June 1992, at 2, 9. Haiti Insight is a bulletin which focuses on refugee and human 
rights affairs published by the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees. 
128. Id. at 9. 
129. See HAITI INSIGHT, Winter 1993, at 8-9, 13-16. 
130. News Briefs, HAITI INSIGHT, Mar. 1994, at 5. 
13 I. International efforts at finding a solution to the Haiti situation increased 
significantly during 1993. On July 3, 1993, the Governor's Island Agreement drafted 
by mediators of the OAS/UN (Dante Caputo) and the United States Special Envoy to 
Haiti (Lawrence Pezzullo) was agreed to by President Aristide and the de facto military 
rulers. Under the agreement President Aristide would return on October 30, 1993, to 
resume power after confirming a new prime minister. Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras, 
Commander-in-Chief of the military, would go into early retirement and a new military 
commander would be appointed by members of the army general staff. In addition, 
amnesty would be granted by the Presidency, and a law would be adopted establishing 
a new police force separate from the armed forces. The commander of the new police 
force would be named by President Aristide. President Aristide appointed his Prime 
Minister on July 27 (Robert Malva!), and he was sworn in on September 2, 1993. 
On October 11, 1993, the USS Harlan County arrived in Port-au-Prince carrying 
lightly armed U.S. and Canadian troops. When the troops tried to disembark they were 
confronted by an angry crowd of armed thugs. President Clinton ordered the USS 
Harlan County to withdraw. This incident marked the collapse of the Governor's Island 
Agreement. October 30 came and went with the de facto military rulers still in power. 
Not only was there no implementation of the accord, the military rulers installed as 
provisional president a pro-military judge, Emile Jonassaint, on May 11, 1994. See 
AGREEMENT OF GOVERNORS ISLAND, reprintedin ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STA TES, 
INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON the SITUATION OF 
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Haitian problem, 34 were killed in July, and the numbers continued to 
climb with more than 70 deaths reported in November 1993. 132 The 
same holds true for the first part of 1994, with more than 80 deaths 
occurring in the months of January and February. 133 
During the early part of 1994 it was becoming increasingly evident to 
President Aristide that the United States' and international diplomatic 
efforts would not restore him to power any time soon. Given the 
collapse of the only vehicle in place to achieve that goal, the Governor's 
Island Agreement, and the increased violence against his supporters in 
Haiti, President Aristide renounced the 1981 United States-Haiti 
agreement that had been consistently cited in the Interdiction Cases as 
the legal basis for the United States' interdiction program.134 
3. The Interdiction Cases 
During the 1980s and 1990s court challenges to the interdiction 
program created a line of cases, the Interdiction Cases, discussed in this 
section. These cases demonstrate that Haitian refugees subject to the 
interdiction program would not be protected by the federal judiciary. 
While the federal courts have agonized over the human suffering 
surrounding the factual circumstances of the cases, they make it 
abundantly clear that solutions to the problems posed by the Interdiction 
Cases should be left to the political branches of government, the 
executive and the legislative. 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN HAITI 166-67 (1994); see also John M. Goshko, Effects of Shifts on 
Haiti Unclear, Changes Unlikely to Resolve Situation, Foreign Diplomats Say, WASH. 
POST, May 13, 1994, at A42. 
132. See HAITI INSIGHT, Mar. 1994, at 5. Another 34 deaths were reported in 
December 1993. Id 
133. See generally Terror Prevails In Haiti, Human rights Violations and Failed 
Diplomacy, HUMAN RIGHTS w A TCH (publication formerly entitled AMERICAS w A TCH), 
Apr. 1994, at 6 [hereinafter Terror Prevails in Haiti]. See also Haiti Policy Brings Blast 
At Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1994, at Al4. 
134. John M. Goshko, Groups Call US. HaitianPolicya 'Disaster, 'WASH. POST, 
Apr. 10, 1994, atA26 (noting the letter sent to President Clinton ending the accord states 
that refugees returned to Haiti are exposed to "persecution including imprisonment and 
execution"). The State Department has taken the position that the Coast Guard can 
legally stop those vessels that are not registered under the Haitian flag. See Steven 
Greenhouse, Aristide to End Accord That Allows US. to Seize Refugee Boats, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 8, 1994, at A6. The agreement itself expired on October 6, 1994. See "A 
Slow-Motion Mariel": Cubans (and Haitians) Take to Sea, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 
1091, 1093 (1994) [hereinafter Slow-Motion Marie[j. 
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a. Gracey 
A few years after the interdiction program was in place, the Haitian 
Refugee Center, a nonprofit organization whose mission was to assist 
Haitian refugees, and two of its members brought an action in a federal 
district court challenging the interdiction program. 135 In Haitian 
Refugee Center, Inc. v. Gracey, the plaintiffs alleged that the interdiction 
program, implemented through the bilateral agreement with Haiti, 
violated the Refugee Act and the provisions of the INA .relating to 
asylum and withholding of deportation. 136 Plaintiffs further alleged 
that their liberty rights were being violated because the interdiction 
program did not afford them due process in accordance with the Refugee 
Act and the INA. Therefore, plaintiffs alleged it violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.137 Finally, 
the complaint alleged a violation of certain international law principles, 
in particular the nonrefoulement provisions of the 1976 Protocol and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 138 
135. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396 (D.D.C. 1985). 
136. Id. at 1403-04. INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1993) reads in relevant part: 
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically pres-
ent in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of 
such alien's status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted asylum 
in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines 
that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 10l(a)(42)(A). 
Id. INA§ 243(h)(l), 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (1993) states in relevant part: 
Id. 
The Attorney General shall not deport or retum any alien ( other than an alien 
described in section 1251(a)(4)(D) of this title) to a country if the Attorney 
General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in 
such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a par-
ticular social group, or political opinion. 
137. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. at 1405. 
138. Id. at 1405-06. The nonrefoulement(Article 33) provision of the 1967 Protocol 
was incorporated into INA § 243(h)(l) through the Refugee Act. It reads: 
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom 
would be threatened on account ofrace, religion, nationality, membership 
in a particular social group or political opinion. 
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a 
refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to 
the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted 
by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger 
to the community of that country. 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 189 
U.N.T.S. 137, reprintedin HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMIN-
ING REFUGEE STATUS 57, 70 (1979). 
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The government countered with the argument that both the organiza- · 
tion and individual plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the lawsuit. 139 
However, the federal district court did not have difficulty finding 
standing for both plaintiffs. 140 Having found standing, the court 
dismissed the entire complaint for failure to state· a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. 141 With regard to the first allegation relating to 
the right to apply for asylum and withholding of deportation, the court, 
citing the text of the statute, found that these rights attach only if the 
aliens were in the United States. 142 The procedures established by the 
Attorney General only apply to aliens·who are physically present in the 
United States or at a land border or port of entry. 143 The court further 
concluded that there was no due process violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment because aliens have no constitutional right to enter the United 
States and, by extension, the Constitution has no extraterritorial 
139. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. at 1401. 
140. Id at 1402-03. The Haitian Refugee Center met the constitutional requirement 
of standing under the ruling of Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982). 
Gracey, 600 F. Supp. at 1402. Similar to the nonprofit organization in Havens, the 
Haitian Refugee Center's raison d'etre is to provide counseling, legal, and other services 
to a limited class of individuals-Haitian refugees. In addition, the Haitian Refugee 
Center alleged that the interdiction program impaired its ability to provide its basic 
functions, that is to provide counseling to Haitian refugees. The Haitian Refugee Center 
also satisfied the prudential standing requirements under Hunt v. Washington Apple 
Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977): 
[An] association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) 
its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the 
interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organizations purpose; and (c) 
neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation in 
the lawsuit of each of the individual members. 
Gracey, 600 F. Supp. at 1402 ( quoting Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm 'n, 
432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)). 
According to the court, the Haitian Refugee Center members had standing to sue in 
their own right. Therefore, the germaneness prong is satisfied because the primary 
purpose of the Haitian Refugee Center (HRC) is to assist indigent Haitians confronting 
federal authorities. Similarly, the third part of the prudential test is satisfied because the 
defendants do not make any serious assertion that the relief sought, injunctive and declar-
atory relief, requires the participation of individual members. The two Haitian plain-
tiffs, the court found, have alleged injury to their associational rights as a result of the 
government's actions sufficient to acquire standing.· Id at 1402-03. 
141. Id at 1403-07. 
142. Id at 1403-04. 
143. Id at 1404. 
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reach. 144 The court relied on Jean v. Nelson to buttress its conclu-
sion. 145 With regard to the allegation that the interdiction program 
violates international obligations of the United States such as the 1967 
Protocol prohibition against nonrefoulement and the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, the court held that tthese instruments do not 
provide rights upon which the plaintiffs can rely. 146 According to the 
court, Congress incorporated the 1976 Protocol into domestic law 
through the Refugee. Act, and the 1976 Protocol is not self-execut-
ing. 147 The court further found that the Refugee Act does not provide 
refugees with rights outside of the United States.148 Similarly, the 
court held that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a 
nonbinding international instrument. 149 
With regard to the interdiction program itself, the court noted that 
interdiction is only allowed outside the territorial waters of the United 
States and therefore the Coast Guard was acting properly under its 
enabling statute. 150 The court then concluded that "an agreement with 
another country specifically granting the United States permission to 
return seized vessels and migrants to that country makes such return 
proper" under federal law. 151 But the court did not stop here. The 
court also found that the President's power to prevent the entry of 
migrants from the high seas is constitutionally based in the President's 
foreign relations power. 152 Some scholars would disagree that there 
144. Id. at 1405 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), Galvan v. 
Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954), and Landon v. Plascencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982)). 
145. Id. "Aliens seeking admission to the United States therefore have no 
constitutional rights with regard to their applications and must be content to accept 
whatever statutory rights and privileges they are granted by Congress." Id. ( quoting Jean 
v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957,967 (11th Cir. 1984)). 
146. Id. at 1405. 
147. Id. at 1406 (citing Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F. 2d 204, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1982) for 
the proposition that "the United Nations Protocol is not self-executing"). 
148. Id. 
149. Id. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1948, G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc.1/777 
(1948), reprintedin lNT'L HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 440.1 (R. Lillich ed., 1986). 
150. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. at 1400 (citing 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1994)). The statute 
reads as follows: 
(a) The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections, seizures, 
and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has 
jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of the 
laws of the United States .... When from such inquiries ... it appears that 
a breach of the laws of the United States ... has been committed ... other 
lawful and appropriate action shall be taken. 
14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1994). 
151. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. at 1400. 
152. Id. (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 
(1936); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952)). 
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is a constitutional basis for the President's foreign affairs power because 
it, like the federal immigration power, is extra-constitutional in nature 
and stems from the attributes of sovereignty rather than directly from the 
Constitution. 153 In fact, the very case cited by the court to support this 
proposition stands for the theory that the foreign affairs power does not 
have a basis in the Constitution, but rather from the inherent attributes 
of a sovereign state. 154 The Gracey decision was promptly ap-
pealed. 155 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court, but on a 
different ground. 156 After considerable discussion of standing under 
Article III of the Constitution, the appeals court concluded that the 
individual appellants lacked standing, and that all appellants, including 
the Haitian Refugee Center lacked prudential standing. 157 Toward the 
end of his concurring opinion, Judge Edwards acknowledged that the 
Haitian human crisis was compelling, but that there was no solution to 
be found in a judicial remedy. 158 
While the Gracey case precluded Haitian refugees from seeking and 
obtaining protection from the federal courts, pressure from refugee 
advocacy groups continued. In particular, an influential report was 
released in 1990 that was highly critical of the interdiction program. 159 
153. See ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 37, at 12 (quoting L. HENKIN, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 16-18 (1972)): 
Id. 
The attempt to build all the foreign affairs powers of the federal government 
with the few bricks provided by the Constitution has not been accepted as 
successful. It requires considerable stretching of language, much reading 
between the lines, and bold extrapolation from the 'Constitution as a whole,' 
and that still does not plausibly add up to all the power which the federal gov-
ernment in fact exercises. 
154. See United States v. Curtiss - Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,318 (1936) 
("It results that the investment of the federal government with the powers of external 
sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution."). 
155. Haitians Refugee Center, Inc. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
156. Id. at 796 (each member of the panel wrote their own opinion). 
157. Id. at 796 n.1. At least one member of the panel did find that the HRC has 
standing in its organizational capacity following the general analysis applied by the 
district court under Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 n.19 (1982). 
However, the same member concurred with the rest of the panel in that neither violation 
of the Fifth Amendment nor the United Nations Protocol provide claims upon which 
relief could be granted. Gracey, 802 F.2d at 823, 828-41. 
158. Id. at 841 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
159. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Refugee Refoulement: The Forced 
Return of Haitians under the U.S. Haitian Interdiction Agreement, reviewed by 67 
INTERPRETER RELEASES 323, 324 (1990) (summarizing the reports and its recommenda-
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The report called for a suspension of the interdiction program while 
recommended changes were implemented. 160 In concluding that 
hundreds of Haitians were wrongfully returned to Haiti under the inter-
diction program, the report suggested certain changes, some of which 
were eventually adopted by the federal government. 161 Furthermore, 
during the latter part of 1990, there was discussion within the INS as 
well as inter-agency meetings within the federal government regarding 
the interdiction program. 162 On March 1, 1991, short term changes 
were implemented through an INS intra-agency memorandum. 163 
Meanwhile, political events in Haiti during that same year seemed 
encouraging. For the first time in its political history, democratic 
elections were held. However, as stated earlier, democracy was short-
lived and lasted just seven months. The military staged a successful 
coup d'etat forcing President Aristide to leave the country. 
In the aftermath of the coup d'etat, the interdiction program was 
fundamentally changed. Instead of on-ship interviews, Haitians 
intercepted at sea were· taken to the United States naval station at 
Guantanamo Bay where they were prescreened for initial determination 
of having plausible asylum claims. Those with plausible claims were 
tions). 
160. Id. 
161. Id. The recommended changes include the expansion of personnel and 
resources to make on board interviews more meaningful; that interviewers be provided 
with proper training and receive adequate information on country conditions in Haiti; that 
interviews be conducted in private and that they be recorded; that a comprehensive 
interview questionnaire be developed; and that an independent monitor be present to 
observe the interdiction procedures, preferably someone from the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees. 
162. INS Deputy Commissioner Ricardo Izunza was an important "mover" for INS 
discussion. Id. This change in the government's attitude was motivated by the Lawyer's 
Committee Report. Additionally, the key player in the interagency context was the U.S. 
Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, Jewel LaFontant-Mankarious. INS RevisesPolicyfor 
Screening Haitians Interdicted at Sea, 68 INTERPRETER RELEASES 793, 794 (1991) 
[hereinafter INS Revises Policy]. 
163. Memorandum from Gregg A. Beyer, Director of Asylum, to Leon Tennings, 
Chief Asylum Pre-Screening Unit and Erich Cauller, Director, Miami Asylum Office 
(Mar. l, 1991), in Appendix I, 68 INTERPRE1ER RELEASES 804 (July 1, 1991). The 
changes included an opening presentation by the INS of the purpose of on board 
interviews and recognition that a person may be brought to the United States to seek 
asylum. Further, interdicted Haitians were asked specific questions designed to measure 
the reasons for leaving Haiti and the fear of returning. Any Haitian who expressed a 
fear of returning would be given a more in-depth interview. Those expressing reasonable 
fears of returning would be sent to the United States and allowed to submit an asylum 
application. The INS Asylum Branch and Office of General Counsel also conducted 
specialized training in country conditions for individuals who interviewed interdicted 
Haitians. Id. These changes have allowed at least 17 Haitians to be taken to Miami 
since the beginning of 1991. This was more than in the entire 10-year history of the 
interdiction program. INS Revises Policy, supra note 162, at 795-96. 
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paroled into the United States in order to pursue formal asylum 
applications. 164 Between the coup d'etat and the end of May 1992, 
the Coast Guard intercepted more than 35,000 Haitians, 9,000 of which 
were allowed to pursue their asylum claims in the United States. 165 
Because of concern that the prescreening policywas_enticing Haitians 
to leave their politically troubled and economically embargoed country, 
the United States changed its policy concerning the interdiction program 
yet again. The new policy, embodied in the Kennebunkport Declaration, 
was to return immediately all Haitians intercepted at sea to Haiti without 
any prescreening process. As a result, the only way. Haitians could 
apply for political asylum was at the United States embassy in Haiti. 166 
The Kennebunkport Declaration and the forcible return policy without 
the possibility to apply for asylum led to the next. round in the Interdic-
tion Cases. 
b. Baker 
In Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 167 the Federal District 
Court for the Southern District of Florida got beyond the obstacles of 
standing and the political question doctrine to discuss the merits of the 
case involving, among other issues, nonrefoulement. The immediate 
decision before the court was whether to grant plaintiffs, the Haitian 
164. For a comprehensive analysis of the treatment of Haitian asylum cases screened 
at Guantanamo Bay see IACHR REPORT, supra note 11 I, at 141-66. 
165. Al Kamen,· U.S. Phasing Out Tent City for Haitian Refugees at Guantanamo, 
WASH. POST, May 29, 1992, at A24. Approximately 240 of the applicants that were 
found to have plausible asylum claims were also found to be infected with the human 
immunodeficiency virus ("HIV"), which is believed· to cause Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS"). Infection with the HIV virus is a ground for exclusion 
under 8 USC§ l 182(a)(l)(A)(i) (1995). Moreover, the U.S. government kept the HIV-
infected Haitians at Guantanamo Bay even after everyone had either been sent back to 
Haiti or paroled to enter the United States, notwithstanding the fact that military doctors 
declared that these Haitians could not be treated adequately at Guantanamo Bay. It took 
a court order to force the government to move on this issue and either allow the Haitians 
to enter the United States for medical treatment or to evacuate the Haitians to another 
place, other than Haiti, for treatment. They were ultimately brought into the United 
States. See Haitian Ctrs. Council v. Sale, 817 F. Supp. 336 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); see also 
Judge Orders Adequate Medica!Treatmentfor HIV Haitians, 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES 
414-15 (1993). 
166. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23;133 (1992). 
167. 789 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1991). For the court's discussion on standing 
andjusticiability, see id at 1559°66. See supra note 34 and accompanying text for the 
definition of nonrefoulement. 
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Refugee Center (HRC) and individual Haitian refugees, a preliminary 
injunction against continued interdiction and forcible repatriation. 168 
While plaintiffs advanced several arguments that their rights were 
violated by the interdiction program, the court focused on two of those 
arguments: (1) Article 33 of the UN Protocol relating to 
nonrefoulement, and (2) the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion. 169 
i. UN Protocol 
The court recognized that the question was a close one, but it 
determined that there was a substantial likelihood that the UN Protocol 
is self-executing, and that its nonrefoulement protections extended to 
Haitians interdicted on the high seas. 170 The court began its discussion 
on self-execution by stating that a treaty can become binding through 
implementing legislation on the part of a signatory state, or through self-
execution.171 The· court found that the UN Protocol was partially 
implemented through the Refugee Act. 172 However, since the Refu-
gee Act does not extend to aliens outside of the United States, 
nonrefoulement protection abroad had not been implemented through 
domestic legislation. 173 The self-executing provisions of a treaty 
become binding on a signatory state upon the treaty's ratification. 174 
The court then cited two cases which supported the proposition that the 
UN Protocol is self-executing. 175 While acknowledging that the UN 
168. Baker, 789 F. Supp. at 1554. 
169. Id at 1567. Plaintiffs alleged that the interdiction program violated their rights 
and the rights of the class members. Plaintiffs alleged the sources of those rights as: 
(1) Article 33 of the UN Protocol (nonrefoulement); (2) the First Amendment to the 
Constitution; (3) the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution; (4) Executive Order 12,324 
and the guidelines implementing that order; (5) the Refugee Act; ( 6) the Immigration and 
Nationality Act; and (7) the Administrative Procedures Act. Id at 1567-78. 
170. Id at 1568, 1570. 
171. Id at 1567-68. 
172. Id at 1569. 
173. Id at 1567 (quoting Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1982)). 
174. Id at 1568. 
175. Id The court relied on Nicosia v. Wall, 442 F.2d 1005, 1006, n.4 (5th,Cir. 
1971) ("[W]ithout acknowledging implementing legislation the UN Protocol binds 
acceding countries."). The court also relied on Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 539 F. Supp. 
925, 935 n.25 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (stating inclination toward position that the UN Protocol 
is self-executing). Baker, 789 F. Supp. at 1568. The court further relied on INS v. 
Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 416 (1984) ("The Protocol bound parties to comply with the 
substantive provisions of Articles 2 through 34 of the United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees."). Baker, 789 F. Supp. at 1568. The court did 
acknowledge cases contrary to its finding that the UN Protocol was self-executing: 
Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396, 1403-04 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Bertrand 
v. Sava, 684 F. 2d 204, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1982). Baker, 789 F. Supp. at 1568-69. 
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Protocol itself contains no express provision on self-execution, the court 
found that the subject matter of the treaty, the legislative history, and 
subsequent constructions of the treaty support the determination 
affirming self-execution. 176 Finding the nonrefoulement provision 
under the UN Protocol to be self-executing, the court then concluded 
that it applies to Haitians interdicted on the high seas. 177 The federal 
district court entered an order granting limited injunctive relief which 
prohibited the federal government from forcefully repatriating Haitians 
in their custody until the underlying merits of the case were decided, or 
176. Baker, 789 F. Supp. at 1568 (citing Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-
ExecutingTreaties in the United States: A Critical Analysis, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 627, 656 
n.122 ( 1986) ). The court noted that the intent of the parties was unclear because of the 
treaty's multilateral nature. In the United States, determining whether a treaty provision 
is self-executing is even more confusing because many countries lack an equivalent of 
the Supremacy Clause. The court's reasoning considered the following areas: 
1. Subject Matier: The nonrefoulementprovision does not call for or require explicit 
state legislative action such as the appropriation of money or the imposition of sanctions. 
Since the provision does not mandate material assistance, or expenditure of funds, it 
should operate by itself without the aid oflegislation. Further, the mandatory nature of 
the provision supports the finding of self-execution. See UN Protocol, art. 7, para. 1 
(prohibiting parties from excluding or modifying the non-refoulement provision). 
2. Legislative History: Of the various grounds given by the court under legislative 
history, the most persuasive is that the Department of State specifically noted that 
legislation was not required to implement the Protocol. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
LIBRARY OF CONG., 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REVIEW OF U.S. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT 
PROGRAMS AND POLICIES 14 (Comm. Print 1979), reprintedin Note, Interdiction: The 
United States 'Continuing Violation of International Law, 68 B. U. L. Rev. 773, 785-861 
(1988). 
3. Subsequent Construction: The court disagreed with the two cases deciding against 
self-execution: Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F .2d 204, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1982); Haitian Refugee 
Ctr. v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396, 1403-04 (D.C. 1985). Baker, 789 F. Supp. at 1568-
69. The court relied on various cases in addition to those already cited: Sannon v. 
United States, 427 F. Supp. 1270, 1274 (S.D. Fla. 1977); In re Dunbar, No. 2191 (Int. 
Dec. Immigration Ct. App., Apr. 17, 1973), in 14 ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS UNDER 
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAWS ( 1971-197 4) (referring to the Protocol, the BIA 
stated "[s]uch a treaty, being self-executing, has the force and· effect of an act of 
Congress"). 
· 177. Baker, 789 F. Supp. at 1569-71. The court relied on three grounds. First, 
Article 32 of the UN Protocol specifically states that unless the ordinary meaning of the 
Protocol's text is obscure or unreasonable, an interpreting body cannot look to 
supplementary means in aiding interpretation such as TravauxPreparatoire( development 
and negotiation of an agreement). Second, the plain language of the Protocol itself 
manifests a purpose to provide ample protection to those fleeing persecution. Third, 
subsequent construction by the United States government indicates coverage. In 
particular, Executive Order 12,324, which establishes the interdiction program in 
international waters, provides that "no person who is a refugee will be returned without 
his consent." Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48, 49 (1987). 
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until the government implements the INS guidelines aimed at ensuring 
that bona fide refugees are not returned to Haiti under the 
nonrefoulement provisions of Article 33 of the UN Protocol. 178 
ii. Right of Access under the First Amendment 
The Baker plaintiffs further argued that HRC's right of access to the 
interdicted Haitians was violated because the government was forcibly 
repatriating the interdictees. 179 Because the HRC's basic mission is to 
provide free counsel as United States citizens to Haitian refugees, the 
district court found that the. HRC could invoke constitutional rights 
abroad. 180 While the court had some difficulty extending the right of 
access to the naval station at Guantanamo Bay because it is a military 
installation, the extraordinary facts surrounding the case justified access 
as long as it was reasonable in terms of time, place, and manner. 181 
This decision caused the government sufficient concern to immediately 
appeal that part of the preliminary injunction related to the First 
Amendment claim and Article 33 of the UN Protocol. 182 The court of 
appeals found that the district court misapplied the law in granting the 
preliminary injunction. 183 The appellate court dissolved the prelimi-
nary injunction and remanded the case with specific instructions to 
dismiss, on the merits, the allegations based on Article 33 of the UN 
Protocol. 184 
On remand, the district court once again granted a temporary 
restraining order and an appeal was immediately taken. 185 Because the 
appellate court instructed that the claims based on Article 33 could not 
prevail, the district found that the HRC plaintiffs showed a likelihood of 
178. Baker, 789 F. Supp. at 1570-71. 
179. Id. at 1571. 
180. Id. at 1572-73. The court relied on Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) and 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). Baker, 789 F. Supp. at 1573. 
181. Baker, 789 F. Supp. at 1574-75. 
182. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109 (11th Cir. 1991). 
183. Id. at 1110. 
184. Id. at 1111. The dissent to the panel's decision sided with the district court. 
Id. at 1111-17. The dissent reasoned that the government prevented the Haitians from 
reaching the territorial limits of the United States through the interdiction program in 
order to prevent them from obtaining proper, fair, and adequate screening procedures. 
Further, once entering United States territory, Haitians would have greater access to 
counseling from the HRC and volunteer lawyers for the correct application of 
immigration laws. Like the district court, the dissent found that the treaty's subject 
matter, legislative history, and subsequent construction support the proposition that 
Article 33 is self-executing. Consequently, Article 33 applies abroad. For this latter 
proposition, the dissent relied. on United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 (1989). Baker, 
949 F.2d at 1115. 
185. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 953 F.:2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1992). 
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prevailing under an Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claim.186 
The district court also found that the plaintiffs' claim was based on 
enforceable rights under various authorities, including customary 
international law. 187 Finally, the district court reiterated its holding 
that the· First Amendment rights of access would prevail on the 
merits. 188 
The legal wrangling became rather complicated during this period with 
various orders issued by the district court halting the interdiction 
program, followed by corresponding stays by the court of appeals. 189 
In· consolidating the various actions, the Eleventh Circuit made some 
clerical errors that added to the confusion. For example, a clerical error 
let the district order regarding the interdiction program stand. The 
government filed an emergency petition to · stay the lower court's 
order. 190 When the Eleventh Circuit did not act on the emergency stay 
fast enough for the federal government, an emergency stay petition was 
filed with the Supreme Court. 191 The Supreme Court finally stayed the 
district court order by a six to three vote pending the appeals court 
decision on the merits.192 
A decision by the court of appeals came soon thereafter. After 
considerable discussion of the APA and First Amendment claims, the 
appellate court remanded the case once again to the district court with 
the mandate that the action be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. 193 The Supreme Court · denied certiorari 
to hear the case. 194 This effectively ended the Baker litigation. 
However, the High Court could not avoid deciding questions arising out 
of the United States' nonrefoulement obligations under Article 33 of the 
UN Protocol nor could it ignore the INA's withholding of deportation 
provisions relating to Haitian boatpeople. 
186. Id. at 1504. 
187. Id. at 1505. The authorities include the Executive Order, the INA, the Refugee 
Act, and the INS Guidelines. · 
188. Id. 
189. See Supreme Court Lifts Ban on Forced Repatriation of Haitians, 69 
INTERPRETER RELEASES 149, 150 (1992). 
190. Id. at 150. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. See Baker, 953 F.2d at 1516. There was yet another dissent supporting the 
district court. Id. at 1515-25 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). 
194. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 502 U.S. 1122 (1992). 
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c. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council
Soon after the Baker case was denied certiorari, a complaint was filed 
in the Second Circuit that challenged various policies of the United 
States government affecting Haitians and Haitian service organiza-
tions. 195 The lawsuit challenged the government's refusal to allow 
immigration counseling organizations access to Haitian refugees who 
were aboard Coast Guard cutters and at Guantanamo· Bay. The 
government's refusal was alleged to be in violation of the First 
Amendment. 196 The complaint further alleged that the interdiction 
program violated the Fifth Amendment, the APA, domestic immigration 
laws, certain executive proclamations, and certain treaties and interna-
tional agreements. 197 
During oral argument, the government claimed that the Baker 
litigation, or "Florida Action" as it was called by the court, barred the 
claims advanced by the New York action. 198 However, the district 
court disagreed, reasoning that the Florida Action only applied to 
"screened-out" Haitians, not those who were "screened-in."199 On 
March 27, 1992, the district court entered a temporary restraining order 
against the government and on April 7, 1992, issued a preliminary 
injunction.200 The government's motion to stay the April 7 order was 
denied by both the district court and the court of appeals.201 More-
over, the court of appeals granted the government's application to 
expedite the appeal given the weighty questions involved and the 
195. Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1331 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated 
as moot sub nom. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. 3028 (1993). 
196. McNary, 969 F.2d at 1332. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. A "screened-out" Haitian is one who is allowed to continue to the United 
States in order to submit an asylum application before the INS, while "screened-in" 
Haitians are those who were brought to Guantanmo Bay, but whose credible claim to 
asylum was yet to be determined by the INS. Id. 
200. Id. The district court made considerable findings of fact set forth by the court 
of appeals. Id. at 1332-33. 
201. Id. at 1333. The April 7 order was amended by the district court on April 15; 
the clarified order enjoined the government from the following: 
• denying the Haitian service organizations access to screened-in Haitians at 
Guantanamo Bay for the purpose of providing counsel and representation; 
• interviewing, screening, and subjecting to exclusion or asylum proceedings 
any screened-in Haitian who was denied communication with counsel; and 
• repatriating any screened-in Haitian who was subjected to a second interview 
until that person had a chance to communicate with a Haitian service 
organization. 
See id. at 1334. 
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immediate foreign policy and national interest. concerns at stake.202 
After further procedural wrangling, the Supreme Court accepted the 
government's contention that the order and clarification could potentially 
harm the foreign policy of the United States and stayed both the April 
7 order and the April 15 clarification· order pending resolution of the 
case by the court of appeals.203 The court of appeals handed down its 
decision on June 10, 1992, and affirmed the district court's preliminary 
injunction with certain modifications.204 
While the appellate decision was pending, the government changed its 
policy on repatriation and instructed the Coast Guard to return all 
Haitians intercepted at sea without providing any screening at 
Guantanamo Bay.205 The new policy extended to aliens interdicted 
beyond the territorial sea of the United States.206 The district court 
denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the 
government from returning interdicted Haitians to their country pursuant 
to the new policy; plaintiffs then appealed. The court of appeals subse-
quently reversed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion.207 The 
Second Circuit's decision conflicted with the decisions by the Eleventh 
Circuit and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The 
district court. did not have the opportunity to decide any aspect of the 
case and the Second Circuit's decision was mooted by the Supreme 
Court's grant of certiorari.208 
202. Id 
203. McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 112 S. Ct. 1714 (1992); see also Supreme 
Court Hears Argument in Haitian Refugee Case, 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES 278 (1993). 
204. McNary, 969 F.2d at 1326, 1347. The appeals court vacated that part of the 
order requiring that screened-in Haitians have access to attorneys at Guantanamo Bay, 
but supported the parts enjoining further processing of screened-in Haitians at 
Guantanamo Bay and disallowing repatriation prior to the time they had access to 
attorneys through the Haitian service providers. Id 
205. See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text. 
206. 8 GORDON ET AL., supra note 36, at 474. 
The President has authority to suspend the entry of aliens coming by sea to the 
United States without necessary documentation, to establish reasonable rules 
and regulations regarding, .and other limitations on, the entry or attempted 
entry of aliens into the United States, and to repatriate aliens interdicted 
beyond the territorial sea of the United States. 
Id (quoting Exec. Order No. 12,807) (emphasis added). 
207. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (1992), rev'dsub nom. 
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2544 (1993). 
208 S Sale v. Haitians Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 3028 (1993). 
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On June 21, 1993, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in 
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. 209 The Court began its analysis 
with a historical account of the interdiction program. In 1981, the 
United States and Haiti entered into a bilateral agreement under which 
the United States would intercept Haitians on the high seas, immediately 
interview them for possible asylum claims pursuant to international 
refugee law and then return those not qualifying (the vast majority of the 
Haitians) to Haiti.210 The flow of Haitian refugees greatly increased 
after the overthrow of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in September, 
1991.211 On May 24, 1992, because of the interview locations, Coast 
Guard cutters and the United States naval base at Guantanamo Bay were 
filled to capacity. President Bush signed an executive order directing the 
Coast Guard to interdict Haitians in international waters and return them 
directly to Haiti without interviewing them for asylum claims. This 
executive order remained in effect under President Clinton while the case 
was being heard by the Supreme Court.212 
The plaintiffs, organizations representing detained and interdicted 
Haitians, sought an injunction barring implementation of the executive 
order. They claimed that the order violated§ 243(h)(l) of the INA and 
Article 33 of the 1951 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, both of which prohibit the return of refugees to countries 
where they face persecution.213 Plaintiffs argued that these provisions 
applied extraterritorially to actions by the United States in international 
waters. After the district court denied plaintiffs' request for an 
injunction, the court of appeals reversed, holding that INA § 243(h)(l), 
which is coextensive with Article 33 of the Convention, applies to "all 
[aliens], regardless of [their] location".214 
The Supreme Court stayed the Second Circuit's order pending the 
government's appeal because of the potential harm to United States 
foreign policy if the forced returns were stopped. In an 8-1 decision, the 
Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and upheld the executive 
order.215 Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion and Justice 
Blackmun issued a dissent.216 
209. 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993). 
210. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
211. See Thousands Flee Haiti's Terror, Fill Refugee Camps at Guantanamo, HAITI 
INSIGHT, Winter 1992, at 4. 
212. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2555-56. 
213. Id. at 2556. 
214. Id. at 2557-58 (quoting Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 
1362 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
215. Id. at 2567 
216. The Sale dissent is located at 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2567. 
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i. INA § 243(h)(l) 
A fundamental question before the court was whether INA 
§ 243(h)(l), which prohibited returning refugees who faced persecution, 
applied extraterritorially.217 Justice Stevens reasoned that both the text 
and the legislative history of the current version of INA § 243(h)(l) 
supported the conclu'sion that it did not apply to acts outside the United 
States' territory.218 Section 243(h)(l) requires the United States to 
determine the validity of an alien's nonrefoulement or withholding of 
deportation claim before returning the alien to his home country.219 
The plaintiffs argued that the statute's lack of geographical limitations 
and use of language such as "any alien" and "return" required the 
obligation to apply to United States action against asylum seekers, even 
outside of its territory. 220 
First, Justice Stevens reasoned that the obligations contained in INA 
§ 243(h)(l) do not apply to actions by the President because the section 
expressly references the Attorney General only. He concluded that 
since, in other sections of the INA, Congress expressly referred to the 
obligations of the President, Secretary of State, etc., the use of the term 
"Attorney General" in this section "cannot reasonably be construed to 
describe either the President or the Coast Guard."221 Justice Blackmun, 
in dissent, noted that the Coast Guard acts as an agent of the Attorney 
General in enforcing immigration laws, and therefore the obligations 
should apply to actions under the·executive order.222 
Justice Stevens further reasoned that the INA does not impose any 
extraterritorial obligations, even on the Attorney General, because the 
INA nowhere provides for extraterritorial proceedings. Similarly, INA 
§ 243(h)(l) is located in Part V of the statute, which clearly contem-
plates procedures held in the United States. Even if Part V dealt with 
international matters, Justice Stevens concluded, "the presumption that 
Acts of Congress do not ordinarily apply outside our borders would 
217. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2552. 
218. Id at 2559-62. 
219. For a discussion on withholding of deportation, see supra note 34 and 
accompanying text. 
220. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2558. 
221. Id. at 2559-60. 
222. Id at 2573. 
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support an interpretation of INA § 243(h)(l) as applying only within 
United States territory." 223 
The relevant legislative history involved amendments made to the INA 
in the Refugee Act.224 Those amendments, enacted to bring the United 
States into conformity with the UN Protocol, deleted the phrase "within 
the United States" as a description of aliens whose asylum claims must 
be determined by the Attorney General. 225 Plaintiffs argued, and 
Justice Blackmun in dissent agreed, that in dropping this phrase 
Congress clearly intended to give extraterritorial application to the INA 
section regarding asylum determinations.226 Justice Blackmun stated 
that "to read into § 243(h)'s mandate a territorial restriction is to restore 
the very language that Congress removed."227 But the majority 
rejected this view, stating that the phrase "within the United States" was 
intended to erase a legal distinction between aliens that the federal 
government was trying to deport (those who were "within the United 
States") and aliens that the federal government was trying to exclude 
from entering the United States at a border. Under the entry doctrine 
these aliens are not yet legally or technically "within the United States," 
even if physically on United States territory.228 Justice Stevens cited 
case law to show that the phrase "within the United States" in fact had 
more to do with an alien's legal status than with his location.229 From 
this, he concluded that the deletion of this phrase was not intended to 
make INA obligations applicable extraterritorially, but rather to make 
them applicable to aliens in exclusion proceedings at the border. Justice 
Stevens also used the elimination of the deportation/exclusion distinction 
to explain Congress' addition of "or return" in INA § 243(h), rejecting 
the argument that "return" was added intentionally to give INA § 243(h) 
extraterritorial application. 230 
To further support his argument, Justice Stevens noted that there was 
no explicit evidence that Congress intended to make the INA apply 
extraterritorially. He stated: "[i]t would have been extraordinary for 
Congress to make such an important change in the law without any 
mention of that possible effect. Not a scintilla of evidence of such an 
223. Id. at 2560 (citations omitted). 
224. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. 
225. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2561. 
226. Id. at 2574-75. 
227. Id. at 2574. 
228. Id. at 2561. For a discussion of the entry doctrine, see supra notes 39-41. 
229. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2561 (citing Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 
345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953)) . 
230. Id. at 2562. 
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intent can be found in the legislative history."231 In an interesting duel 
of statutory construction, Justice Blackmun reached the opposite 
conclusion, claiming that Congress could, and in places did, limit the 
applicability of the INA to United States territory, but that since INA 
§ 243(h) contained no such limitation, it should not be so narrowly 
construed given the other arguments pointing toward extraterritorial 
application.232 In sum, Justice Stevens found that obligations under 
INA § 243(h) apply only to the Attorney General, and even then only 
in domestic procedures.233 
ii. UN Convention and Protocol 
Another fundamental question decided by the Supreme Court was 
whether the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, as incorporated in the UN Protocol, applies extraterritorially 
to prohibit the United States from forcibly returning Haitian asylum-
seekers.234 Article 33 of the Convention contains two sections; the 
first (33.1) states that "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return 
("refouler") a refugee . . . to [ a territory] where his life or freedom 
would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group or political opinion."235 The second 
section (33 .2) states that the benefits of the first section may not be 
claimed "by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding 
as a danger to the security of the country in which he is."236 
Justice Stevens made two textual arguments to support his conclusion 
that Article 33 was not intended to apply extraterritorially. First, he 
claimed that the reference in section 33.2 to the location of the alien 
shows that the Convention did not contemplate aliens not yet at their 
country of origjn. Thus, he argued that Article 33 did not apply to the 
Haitian case since "an alien intercepted on the High Seas is in no 
country at all."237 Justice Blackmun, however, argued that the two 
sections are separable, making the locational reference in section 33.2 
231. Id at 2561. 
232. Id at 2570. 
233. See id. at 2558-67. 





irrelevant to the obligations in section 33 .1 which contain no geographic-
al limitation.238 
Justice Stevens' second textual argument responded to plaintiffs' and 
Justice Blackmun's argument that the use of the word "return" in Article 
33, as in the analogous INA § 243(h), has an ordinary meaning which 
would include picking up aliens at sea and returning them to their 
country of origin.239 Justice Stevens rejected this argument by relying 
on the meaning of the French equivalent for return, "refouler." He 
reasons that since "refouler" (the exact French word used in the official 
text of the Convention and parenthetically in the English version of the 
Convention) has a connotation of repel or drive back, "return" as used 
in the Convention, as it is in INA § 243, is meant to apply to exclusion 
proceedings at a country's border.240 
Justice Stevens also cited the negotiating history of Article 33 to 
support his narrow reading of the word "return."241 He cited exten-
sively from a 1951 negotiating conference which he claimed showed a 
"general consensus" that the word "return" referred to an alien that was 
already within a territory but not yet resident there.242 Even if some 
countries expressed their intent that the Convention should protect all 
aliens wherever found, Justice Stevens believed that the negotiating 
conference supported the majority's refusal to impose obligations that 
are broader than the text of the Convention.243 Justice Blackmun, 
however, characterized Justice Stevens' citations as "fragments, not 
entitled to deference, were never voted on or adopted, probably represent 
a minority view, and in any event do not address the issue in this case, 
[seizing aliens not yet at a country's border]."244 Although the Court 
could not bring itself to characterize the interdiction program as a 
violation of domestic law and even found that the Convention's 
nonrefoulement requirement was not self-executing, the Court did 
indicate that government actions "may . . . violate the spirit of Article 
33."245 
The Sale opinion has been criticized on several grounds. A funda-
mental critique is that the decision does not recognize that under 
international law a State's responsibility extends beyond the actual 
238. Id at 2568. 
239. Id at 2568-69. 
240. Id at 2564. 
241. Id at 2565-66. 
242. Id. at 2566-67. 
243. Id. at 2567. 
244. Id. at 2572-73. 
245. Id at 2565 (emphasis added). 
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territory over which it exercises jurisdiction.246 Furthermore, unlike 
other provisions in the 1951 Convention, Article 3 3 .1 does not restrict 
rights and benefits based on lawful presence and residence. As Justice 
Blackmun observed in his dissent, Article 33.1 forbids the return of a 
refugee in any manner whatsoever.247 
Moreover, another problem with the Sale opinion is that it contained 
little analysis of international law and relied heavily on domestic law. 
Greater reliance on the amicus curiae brief submitted by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees would have taken the Court's 
reasoning more into the realm of international law. 248 Thus, the Sale 
case is more an expression of domestic law than international law.249 
In short, the Sale decision further confirms the narrow scope the 
Supreme Court will give to domestic legislation and international 
agreements protecting certain human rights. Specifically, the right of 
nonrefoulement has been significantly curtailed. This development is 
particularly troubling when considered in the context of the United 
States' compliance with international human rights obligations.250 The 
Sale decision signals that the present Court will construe United States 
246. See Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Comment, The Haitian RefoulementCase, 6 INT'L 
J. REFUGEE L 103 (1994). 
247. Id 
248. Id. at 104-05. The United Nations has placed the responsibility for refugees 
and stateless persons under the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees whose 
office was established pursuant to the Statute of the office of the United Nations 
Commissioner for Refugees, General Assembly Resolution 428( v) of 14 December 1950, 
reprintedinCOLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS CONCERNING REFUGEES 3-9 
(UNHCR 1979) [hereinafter UNHCR]. The UNHCR's work is considered non-political 
and entirely social and humanitarian. The UNHCR submitted amicus curiae briefs in all 
three Interdiction Cases at the court of appeals level and at the Supreme Court level in 
the Sale case (briefs are on file with author). In its amicus curiae brief to the Supreme 
Court the UNHCR states: 
The customary law rule ofnon-return reflects a judgement by the international 
community that the obligations of a State with respect to such a fundamental 
right cannot stop at the State's borders. The obligation not to return a refugee 
arises wherever a government encounters the individual refugee, irrespective 
of whether that government waits for the refugee to arrive at the border or 
intercepts him or her on the high seas. 
Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Respondents, at I 9-20, Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. 
2549 (1993) (No. 92-344). 
249. Goodwin-Gil, Comment, supra note 246, at 105. 
250. The UNHCR submitted amicus curiae briefs in all of the Interdiction Cases 
arguing that the international obligation of nonrefoulementapplies to state actions within 
or outside of the state's territorial jurisdiction (briefs on file with author). 
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international obligations in the area of refugee law in particular, and 
human rights in general, as narrowly as possible in order to permit the 
executive branch to exercise its foreign policy power and the perceived 
interests of national security in as flexible a manner as possible. In 
addition, it gives impetus to the growing post-Cold War change in 
foreign policy whereby human rights cease to be a fundamental tenet of 
United States foreign policy. In essence, U.S. policy has moved away 
from human rights considerations and moved towards allowing 
economics to play a pivotal role in foreign policy.251 
C. In-Country Processing: Operation and Critique 
The third component of the United States' policy·regarding Haitian 
refugees has been in-country processing. While the pre-screening 
program of interdicted Haitians was in effect at Guantanamo Bay, the 
United States established an in-country processing program in Haiti 
itself.252 The creation of an In-Country Processing (ICP) program, in 
theory, affords Haitians the possibility of applying for refugee status 
while in Haiti, thereby discouraging flight. The ICP program, although 
not widely used by the United States, is part of the overseas refugee 
resettlement program permitted under the INA.253 The· overseas 
refugee program was established to process refugees who were 
"presumptively eligible" for refugee resettlement in the United 
States.254 Historically, the overseas refugee program has been used to 
fill most of the refugee quotas with those fleeing communist regimes or 
United States foes in furtherance of United States foreign policy 
interests.255 
The ICP program works as follows. The President, after consultation 
with Congress, determines a worldwide ceiling and geographic distribu-
tion limitation for refugees. The Department of State, in coordination 
251. This shift is most evident in the Most Favored Nation status that the United 
States continues to grant to the People's Republic of China. See Douglas Jehl, A Policy 
Reversal; President Seeking Other Levers to Get Beijing to Improve Rights, N. Y. TIMES, 
May 27, 1994, at Al. 
252. See United States of America: Forcible return of Haitian Asylum-Seekers by 
the United States, AMNESTY INT'L, Jan. 1994, at 2-4 [hereinafter Forcible Return]; see 
also THE AILA HUMAN RIGHTS DELEGATION REPORT ON HAITI 24-31 (1993) (a general 
discussion of in-country refugee processing in Haiti). 
253. INA § 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1994) (establishing the annual admission of 
refugees for resettlement in the United States). For a discussion of the overseas refugee 
program, see LEGOMSKY, supra note 105, at 822-39. 
254. See Ricardo Insunza, The Refugee Act of 1980: Ten Years After, Still A Way 
to Go, 2 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 413 (1990). 
255. Id. at 418. During 1990, 96% of the 125,000 refugees who settled in the 
United States were applicants from communist or communist-dominated societies. Id. 
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with the INS, then admits refugees into the United States who are not 
firmly resettled in any foreign country, are of special humanitarian 
interest to the United States, and are otherwise admissible into the 
country.256 
As stated, the ICP program is designed to enhance legal protection to 
refugees who are physically present in their homeland. The Haitian ICP 
consisted of three offices and was .funded and managed by the State 
Department.257 The INS adjudicated applications submitted through 
the ICP.258 United States policy increasingly relied on the ICP in Haiti 
as the primary protection offered to Haitians seeking refugee status, and 
saw the program as the answer to forced repatriation.259 From May of 
1992, the year of the Kennebunkport Declaration, to May 1994, the year 
the Clinton administration reversed that policy, the ICP was the only 
vehicle available for Haitians seeking protection from persecution.260 
Even before the ICP program was established in Haiti, it was 
recognized that the lCP would probably not benefit those with the 
greatest need of protection. Simply put, such individuals would be the 
least likely to come forward to processing centers where they ran the 
risk of being identified and possibly arrested.261 In addition, the ICP 
256. LEGOMSKY, supra note 105, at 833. 
257. See generally No Port in a Storm, The Misguided Use of In-Country Refugee 
Processing in Haiti, AMERICAS WATCH, NATIONAL COALITION FOR HAITIAN REFUGEES, 
AND The JESUIT REFUGEE SERVICE/USA, Sept. 1993, at 8-9 [hereinafter No Port in a 
Storm]. There were three service centers: (1) Port-au-Prince, operated by the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM); (2) Les Cayes, operated by Church 
World Service, a joint voluntary agency (JVA); and (3) Cap Haitian, operated by the 
United States Catholic Conference, another JVA. Toward the middle of August 1994, 
the processing centers at Les Cayes and Cap Haitian were informed that no new asylum 
applications were to be accepted until the government evacuated from Haiti the almost 
2,000 approved applicants. All new applications were to be filed through the main 
United States government processing center in Port-au-Prince. See US. Cuts Off 
Applications For Asylum at 2 Haiti Offices, N.Y. TIMES (International), Aug. 17, 1994, 
at A2. 
258. See No Port in a Storm, supra note 257, at 9-12. The ICP process began with 
submitting a preliminary questionnaire, that could be completed with the assistance of 
personnel from the IOM or JV A's. The application was then prioritized, or vetted, into 
categories A, B, and C for adjudication by the Refugee Coordinator's staff. A cases 
were "high priority" (5%), B cases were those in which the applicant had expressed some 
fear of persecution; but which needed to be developed (80%), and C cases were those 
that were meritless (10% to 15%). Id. 
259. Id. at 7-8. 
260. Id. at 7. 
261. Insunza, supra note 254, at 421-22. 
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program is fundamentally limited. The process consumes a great deal 
of time in adjudicating an application and for certifying the applicant as 
a refugee through the United States embassy.262 Even after certifica-
tion, the refugee still needs clearance from the national authorities for 
departure.263 Thus, ICP programs have not been widely used by the 
United States. 
Moreover, particular problems with the Haitian ICP surfaced. First, 
the processing time was lengthy and, as a result, many persons having 
a well-founded fear of persecution could not wait for the processing to 
be completed.264 Second, the central role played by the State Depart-
ment was questionable because most Haitians seeking to leave the 
country, or participate in the ICP program, could be viewed as economic 
migrants.265 Third, the entire system was overloaded and the use of 
local Haitians for staff proved problematic.266 Fourth, the ICP pro-
gram could not provide the typical safeguards for an asylum-seeker, such 
as appropriate legal counsel or meaningful judicial review of cases that 
were denied 267 Without such safeguards, the real risk of detention 
after visiting an ICP center often deterred those individuals who had a 
genuine fear of persecution from participating in the program.268 In 
fact, the risk of persecution increases once an applicant is identified and 
awaits a decision due to the length of the process.269 Indeed, there 
have been numerous documented cases in which ICP program partici-
pants have been persecuted. 270 
Perhaps the most serious criticism from human rights advocates 
against the Haitian ICP is that the United States considered the ICP as 
a "viable substitute" for the internationally recognized right to flee one's 
262. Id 
263. Id 
264. See No Port in a Storm, supra note 257, at 14. 
265. Id 
266. Id at 19-20. The system was overloaded, in large part, because the program 
was seen as an immigration office, but which limited access only to refugees. Haitians 
serving on the staff were used in all stages of processing and there were problems of 
disrespectful conduct to applicants who were from a different social background or 
possessed a different political opinion. Id 
267. See generallyF orcible Return, supra note 252, at 3-4 ( discussing and critiquing 
the in-country processing system). 
268. Id 
269. Id at 4. 
270. See Terror Prevails in Haiti, supra note 133, at 38 n.100. "For example, 
Pierre Michel Guillame, an active Artistide supporter from Les Cayes, was abducted on 
September 27, [1993], in Port-au-Prince. He was seized by men in a white pick-up 
without license plates as he left the U.S. refugee processing office, according to the 
International Civilian Mission." Id 
720 
[VOL. 32: 673, 1995] Haiti and The United States 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
. 
homeland and seek protection from persecution.271 Therefore, in light 
of the United States' interdiction program which forcibly returned 
refugees without formal determination, the only alternative for these 
refugees was the ICP. Human rights .advocates consider this to have 
eviscerated the international protections offered to refugees through the 
principles of nonrefoulement and first asylum.272 
Ill. CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS 
This section of the Article will discuss some relevant congressional 
actions involving the Haitian situation. Certain legislative measures have 
been chosen· to represent activities in Congress during the 1980s and 
1990s. Since most of these initiatives did not become law, only those 
that express congressional concern during the 1990s will be discussed. 
Additionally, because the federal courts have put the interdiction 
question to the government, legislative policy choices assume more 
importance for those advocating greater protection for Haitian refugees. 
While Congress has "plenary" power over domestic immigration, the 
executive branch holds the reins over foreign affairs. The congressional 
track record on the Haitian situation has been to leave fundamental 
decisions to the executive, except when the question on the use of force 
arises. 
A. House of Representatives 
Criticism over the interdiction program and forced repatriation has 
increased in Congress over the years, especially after the fledgling 
democratic government in Haiti was overthrown by the military in 1991. 
In November 1991, House Resolution 3844, the Haitian Refugee 
Protection Act of 1991, was introduced to the House of Representatives 
and referred to the Committee on· the Judiciary.273 The bill's purpose 
was to ensure the protection of Haitians who were already in the United 
States or who were in the custody of the United States until democracy 
was restored in Haiti.274 The bill proposed a temporary suspension of 
271. Id. at 38. 
272. Frelick, supra note 2, at 689-92. 
273. See H.R. Res. 3844, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
274. Id. pmbl. 
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the repatriation of Haitians housed at Guantanamo Bay,275 the-realloca-
tion of 2,000 refugees admitted under the overseas refugee program,276 
and the granting of temporary protected status for Haitians in the United 
States.277 
Temporary Protected Status (TPS) became part of United States· 
immigration law after the enactment of the Immigration Act of 
1990.278 It established a generic safe-haven law for the first time· in
United States history. The law grants the Attorney General authority to 
permit nationals of designated countries who are otherwise admissible 
into the United States temporary protected status for an initial period not 
to exceed eighteen months. 279 This status may be granted to eligible 
persons in the United States if their return to the designated country is 
deemed unsafe due to ongoing armed conflict, natural disaster, or other 
extraordinary circumstances.280 The INS is forbidden to deport 
persons registered in the program and ·must provide participants work 
authorization. The executive branch did not extend TPS to Haitians in· 
the United States and the Congress did not order the Attorney General 
to grant them TPS. 
A substitute bill to House Resolution 3844 made it out of the Judiciary' 
Committee and was reported to the House of Representatives, albeit with 
weakened provisions. 281 While maintaining the reallocation of the 
2,000 refugee overseas admissions, the substitute bill eliminated the 
grant ofTPS. In addition, the substitute bill would have barred the Bush 
administration from repatriating those Haitians under Uriited States 
custody or control for a period of 180 days after enactment of the· 
legislation or until five days after a State Department report on human 
rights conditions.282 The debate during markup made it clear that there 
were serious differences of opinion regarding whether repatriated 
275. Id. § 2 (Protection of Haitians in United States Custody). 
276. Id. § 3 (Reallocation of2,000 Federally Funded Refugee Admissions During 
Fiscal Year 1992 to Haiti). 
277. Id. § 4 (Temporary Protected Status for Haitians). 
278. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990). · 
279. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 302, 104 Stat. 4978, 5030 
(1990) [hereinafter TPS] (creating a new INA§ 244A). 
280. 8 U.S.C, § 1254a (1994) (allowing additional extension). 
281. The vote was mainly along party lines. For a detailed discussion of the 
markup session, see House Judiciary Committee Approves Haitian Relief Bill, 69 
INTERPRETER RELEASES 215-17 (1994) [hereinafter House Judiciary]; see also 138 
CONG. REC. H586 {daily ed. Feb. 25, 1992). 
282. The 180 day period would begin on February 5, 1992, and the Department of 
State would report to Congress in 90 days on interdicted Haitians who were returned to 
that country and focus on reprisals against the returnees. House Judiciary, supra note 
281, at 215. 
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Haitians were subject to mistreatment.283 The Department of State 
itepresented to Congress that there was "no credible evidence" that 
wraliation had taken place.284 On the other hand, Congress was 
presented with statements made by returned Haitians to United Nations 
officials that they experienced mistreatment sufficient to make them flee 
Haiti a second time. 285 After making various ammendments, the 
House of Representatives. approved House Resolution 3844. The 
approved version did not, however, include an amendment granting 
Haitians TPS. Such a provision had been deleted from the bill by a vote 
of 304 to 96.286 
After President Bush announced the Kennebunkport Declaration, 
requiring the return of all Haitians intercepted on the high seas 
regardless of whether any were refugees, another "Haitian" bill was 
introduced in the House. However, nothing became of it.287 The 
Haitian bills kept coming. During the103rd Congress, another attempt 
was made in the House under House Resolution 3663, the Haitian 
Refugee Fairness Act.288 In addition to similar provisions in the 1991 
version, House Resolution 3663 again provided TPS status to Haitians. 
The Haitian Refugee Fairness Act also contained a provision that would 
explicitly state that the international requirement of nonrefoulement 
would be applied in an extraterritorial manner. 289 The House of 
283. See id at 216. 
284. Id 
285. Id 
286. See 138 CONG. REC. H813 (Feb. 1992). Amendments that were accepted 
included granting the federal government authority to reimburse state and local 
governments for costs associated with resettling Haitians, that no one state would have 
to bear a disproportionate share of the costs associated with resettling Haitians, and a 
Sense of Congress was adopted urging the President to seek United Nations and OAS 
peacekeeping forces to protect repatriated Haitians. See also House Approves Bill 
Suspending Haitian Repatriations, 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 250 (1992). 
287. H.R. 5267, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). The bill would grant Temporary 
Protected Status for Haitians, end the interdiction agreement between the United States 
and Haiti, "and expand refugee processing for Haitians." See Bush Orders Coast Guard 
to Return Al/ Haitians, 69 INIBRPRETER RELEASES 672, 674 (1992). H.R. 4360 was 
introduced containing provisions to prevent U.S. officials from ever returning refugees 
before first determining if they would face persecution. It was approved by voice vote 
by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 30, 1993. 
288. H.R. 3663, 103d Cong., l st Sess. ( 1993 )( containing speech by Congresswomen 
Meeks (D-Fl) upon introduction of the bill). 
289. H.R. 3663, l 03d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (stating the adherence to the international 
law requirement of nonrefoulement'applies wherever the states act and without territorial 
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Representatives thus accepted the invitation given by the Supreme Court 
in Sale to make their legislative intent on the extraterritorial application 
of nonrefoulement known. The Sale decision was decided five months 
before the bill was introduced.290 
B. Congressional Black Caucus Acts 
Members of the Congressional Black Caucus did not support President 
Clinton's decision to adopt the Bush administration's policy on forcible 
return. This policy allowed the United States to forcibly return aliens 
without determining whether the aliens qualified for refugee status.291 
The Clinton administration's decision to defend the Bush 
administration's refugee policy before the Supreme Court in the Sale 
case further eroded the patience of some members of the caucus, 
including its chairman.292 
On March 4, 1993, President Aristide appeared on Capitol Hill .. He 
refrained from attacking the Clinton administration's refugee repatriation 
policy directly, but acknowledged that the practice was becoming more 
difficult to defend. 293 President Aristide expressed greater concern for 
providing Haitian military and police authorities with an ultimatum for 
the date of his return.294 On October 15, 1993, the United States 
increased pressure on the Haitian authorities and ordered naval ships to 
enforce the United Nations embargo.295 However, President Aristide 
still did not return to Haiti on October 30, 1993, as stipulated in the 
Governor's Island agreement.296 In fact, it was becoming clear to 
members of Congress that Haiti's de facto leaders were creating a 
dilemma-the de facto leaders were not going to yield, even in the face 
of the economic embargo, and the Clinton administration did not appear 
to be willing to use force if economic coerci9n failed. 297 
' 
limitation ... Article 33 obligation applies to actions of the United States ... within and 
without the territorial boundaries of the United States"). 
290. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
291. See Holly Idelson, Black Leaders Criticize Continuation of Policy, 51 CONG. 
Q. 520 (Mar. 6, 1993). 
292. Id. Rep. Kweisi Mfume, Chairman of the Congressional Black .Caucus, 




296. See supra note 131. 
297. See Heather M. Fleming, Give Sanctions Time to Bite, Gray Tells Lawmakers, 
52 CONG. Q. 1540 (June 11, 1994). It was also during this time that a controversy 
developed when intelligence information given in a closed-door meeting branded 
President Aristide as mentally unbalanced. Certain Democrats countered this attempt by 
blaming the CIA for disseminating classified information in order to paint an unflattering 
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On March 23, 1994, the Congressional Black Caucus declared "war" 
on the Clinton administration's Haiti policy. They were joined by other 
Democratic lawmakers.298 As part of their campaign, the Governor's 
Island Reinforcement Act of 1994, House Bill 4144, was introduced into 
the House of Representatives.299 The House bill sought to provide 
sanctions against Haiti, and to stop the interdiction and return of Haitian 
refugees. 300 
In the spring of 1994, rising discontent over the inert policy toward 
Haiti, coupled with reports that the de facto regime was tightening its 
grip on Haiti through countless killings, brought tremendous pressure to 
the Clinton administration.301 Through the Congressional Black 
Caucus and the hunger strike of Randall Robinson, Executive Director 
of Transafrica Forum, President Clinton reversed the forcible return 
portrait of President Aristide. Kevin Merida, Hill's Black Caucus Faults US. Policy on 
Haiti, Presses/or Aristide Return, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1994, at A?. 
298. Merida, supra note 297, at A7. 
299. H.R. 4114, 103 Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (the bill was jointly referred to the 
Committee on Ways and Means, Foreign Affairs, Public Works and Transportation, the 
Judiciary, and Banking Finance and Urban Affairs); see also 140 CONG. REc. H2229 
(daily ed. Apr. 14, 1994) (statement by Eleanor Holmes Norton, D-D.C., urging support 
of H.R. 4114 by making comparison to actions led by Randall Robinson ten years ago 
related to South Africa). As the bill was introduced, a letter was sent to President 
Clinton sharply criticizing his Haitian policy. See Black Caucus Urges Tougher Haiti 
Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1994, (special), at Al I. 
300. The bill covered specific activities, including: tighter sanctions on Haiti by 
prohibiting the importation of Haitian goods or services, the export of goods, technology 
or services from the United States to Haiti, other prohibitions affecting United States 
government contracts supporting Haitian industry and commerce, and loans or credit to 
the unelected military leaders of that country. The bill prohibited general transport 
involving Haiti and imposed sanctions against other countrieswho did not cooperate with 
the United States. The bill also called for the return of the full contingent of UN and/or 
OAS human rights monitors, and set up a multinational border patrol between Haiti and 
the Dominican Republic to prevent the economic embargo from being violated. The bill 
would terminate the bilateral migrant interdiction agreement, adhere to the international 
law requirement of nonrefoulementin an extraterritorial manner, grant TPS to Haitians 
in the United States, prevent the issuance of visas, and exclude from admission to the 
United States certain members of the active military as well as block the assets of certain 
Haitians involved in the overthrow of Aristide's government. H.R. 4114, 103d Cong., 
2d Sess. §§ 2-4, 6-9 (1994). 
301. See John M. Goshko, Haiti Policy Impasse, Panel Told, WASH. POST., Mar. 
9, 1994, at A15 (the panel was held before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee 
on hemispheric affairs); see also Steven Greenhouse, Haiti Policy In Stalemate, US. 
Faces PossibilityAristide Won't Return, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1994, at A9. 
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policy embodied in the Kennebunkport Declaration and temporarily 
offered refugee hearings to Haitians interdicted at sea. 302 
Moreover, the House Judiciary Subcommittee on International Law, 
Immigration and Refugees held hearings on June 15, 1994, on House 
Resolution3663 and House Resolution 4114. The second panel included 
representatives from the INS and the Department of State. 303 The INS 
took the position that the bills pending before the Subcommittee were 
unnecessary in light of the President's decision to reverse the policy on 
forced repatriation without refugee determination hearings. 304 More 
importantly, the INS objected to the legislation because it would "unduly 
infringe on the authority of the President in matters of foreign relations 
and national security" by restricting the President's ability to deal with 
alien smuggling and immigration emergencies.305 The INS felt that 
the bills' attempts to resolve the question of economic sanctions would 
also interfere with the government's power to conduct foreign. policy. 
The INS was careful to avoid stating that such interference could be 
unconstitutional since the foreign affairs power, like the immigration 
power, is extra-constitutional in nature. 306 The INS further objected 
to the designation of Haitian nationals for TPS.307 ' 
302. Gwen Ifill, President Names Black Democrat As Haitian Envoy, Sets New 
Asylum Policy, Move Meant to Mark Reversal of Approach Clinton Now Says Is 
Unsustainable,N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1994, at Al; see also Karen De Witt, Hunger Strike 
on Haiti: Partial Victory at Least, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1994, at A7 (Mr. Robinson, a 
well-known and respected lobbyist, went on a 27 day hunger strike insisting that the 
United States provide refugees interviews before repatriating them back to Haiti). 
303. The INS was represented by Chris Sale, Deputy Commissioner. The 
Department of State was represented by Ambassador Brunson McKinley, Acting 
Director, Bureau of Population, Immigration, and Refugees. H.R. 4264, which contains 
similar provisions to H.R. 3663 and H.R. 4114, was also discussed . Hearings on HR. 
3663, HR. 4114, HR. 4264 and Other Issues Related to HaitianAsylum-SeekersBefore 
the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration and 
Refugees, 103 Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1994) (statement of Chris Sale, Deputy Commissioner, 
INS) [hereinafter Sale Testimony] (copy on file with author). 
304. Id. 
305. Id. at 9-10. The INS labeled language in the legislation for conducting refugee 
determinations as vague and possibly subject to different interpretations, thus, 
"hampering" the current interdiction program without creating enforceable substantive 
or procedural standards to protect bona fide refugees.
306. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanymg text. 
307. Sale Testimony, supra note 303, at 10-13. The INS objected to TPS for 
Haitians because it removed the Attorney General's authority. This authority includes 
granting TPS after consultation with other government agencies, establishing an open-
ended designation, and creating a huge magnet for Haitians to leave their country. See 
also Hearings on HR. 3663, HR. 4114, HR. 4264 and Other Issues Related to Haitian 
Asylum-Seekers Before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on International 
Law, Immigrationand Refugees, 103 Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of the Honorable 
Branson McKinley, Acting Director, Bureau of Population, Immigration, and Refugees) 
[hereinafter McKinley Statement] (copy on file with author). 
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,For its part, the Department of State focused its testimony on the push 
for international cooperation in processing Haitians, the actual mechanics 
.of refugee processing aboard ships, land-based processing, monitoring 
returnees, and the fact that in-country processing would continue as part 
of the Clinton administration's policy toward Haiti. With regard to the 
fate of returnees, the Department of State asserted that "repatriated boat 
people are not targeted for retribution by Haitian authorities for 
unauthorized departures."308 For human rights advocates, the concern 
over repatriated Haitians was not a fear of mistreatment for unauthorized 
departures, but that bona fide refugees had been returned and often 
persecuted or killed.309 
C. Senate 
Concern over democracy and the flight of Haitian refugees has also 
been expressed on the Senate floor: On November 22, 1991, soon after 
the coup d'etat, Senate Resolution 2026 was introduced into the 
Senate.310 The Senate bill contained the same provisions discussed in 
House Resolution 3844. Another bill was introduced in November, 
Senate Resolution 2091, which essentially extended TPS to Haitians. 311 
In early.1992, a staff report on Haitian democracy and refugees was 
issued by the Committee on the Judiciary.312 The staff report noted 
increased violence by the return of Ton-Ton Macoutes as "section 
308. Hearings on H.R. 3663, H.R. 4114, H.R. 4264 and Other Issues Related to 
Haitian Asylum-Seekers Before· the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on 
International Law, Immigration and Refugees, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1994). 
309. See Exhibits to Testimony of Steven David Forester, Haitian Refugee Center, 
House Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration, and Refugees (June 15, 1994) 
(copy on file with author); Exhibit E, Susan Benesch, How U.S. Error Sent Haitian to 
His Death, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 18, 1994, at IA (a Haitian refugee who was screened 
at Guantanamo Bay and who was found to be eligible for passage to the United States 
was erroneously returned to Haiti where he was subsequently mutilated and killed by the 
authorities). For a discussion of all the presentations at the hearing, see U.S. Policy on 
Hai tan Boat People Appears Lost at Sea, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 885, 887-88 ( 1994) 
[hereinafter U.S. Policy]. 
310. S. Res. 2026, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
311. S. Res. 2091, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 0991); 137 CONG. REC. S18408-10 (daily 
ed. Nov. 26, 1991). 
312. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 102d Cong., 2d. Sess., Report 
on Haitian Democracy and Refugees: Problems and Prospectives, Feb. 17, 1992 
(prepared for the use of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs) (copy 
on file with author) [hereinafter STAFF REPORT]. 
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chiefs." The Ton-Ton Macoutes represented the national government in 
every subdivision of the country.313 According to the staff report, this 
system of using section chiefs under a government plan would establish 
some 80,000 officers who would have "absolute control" over the 
majority of Haiti's six million inhabitants.314 The section chiefs and 
the "attaches," a post-coup addition, supplemented the repressive forces 
in Haiti bent on terrorizing the population.315 While the staff report 
called for a tighter embargo, it recognized that there was an increasing 
risk of hunger problems.316 With regard to the boatpeople, the staff 
report found that the United States' efforts to get other countries in the 
region to provide temporary refuge to Haitian boatpeople had failed. 317 
Finally, the staff report urged that negotiations be advanced with the 
recognition that the commitment to democracy in Haiti is a long-term 
endeavor.318 
A few days after the staff report was issued, Senate Resolution 2246 
was introduced.319 This legislative initiative suspended the involuntary 
repatriation of Haitians until 180 days after the enactment of the Act or 
five days after the submission to Congress of a State Department report 
on the human rights treatment of returned Haitians.320 The bill, like 
House Resolution 3844, reallocated 2,000 refugee admission numbers for 
Haitians for fiscal year 1992. Later that same year Senate Resolution 
2826 was introduced,321 which contained a congressional statement that 
the United States adhere to the international law requirement of 
nonrefoulement. 322 The bill also extended United States 
nonrefoulement responsibilities extraterritorially and specifically forbade 
any operations in the territorial waters of another country by the federal 
government.323 The Senate did not experience much activity related 
313. Id. at 4 (there are 565 political subdivisions in Haiti). 
314. Id. 
315. Id. at 4-5. "[The attaches] ... stop cars, search houses in the dead of night, 
and otherwise keep the civilian population on edge." Id. at 4. Most affected by these 
practices are the poor, the church, labor unions, and human rights organizations. Id at 
5. 
316. Id at 19-20. 
317. The staff report found that only Honduras and Venezuela took in refugees, 
totaling 350. Id. at 23-24. 
318. Id 43-44. 
319. S. Res. 2246, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 138 CONG. REC. S1939-40 (daily ed. Feb. 
20, 1992) (the Haitian Refugee Protection Act of 1992). 
320. Id § 3(b) (section 3(b) required the State Department to use resources, 
information, and the expertise of human rights organizations). 
321. S. Res. 2826, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 138 CONG. REC. S7717 (daily ed. June 9, 
1992); see id § 4. 
322. Id. § 2(a). 
323. Id. § 2(b),(c). 
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to the Haitian question in 1993. However, 1994 brought renewed efforts 
to legislate in this area. On April 19, 1994, Senate Resolution 2027 was 
introduced and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.324 
Senate Resolution 2027 closely parallels the measure introduced into the 
House by members of the Congressional Black Caucus.325 These 
congressional actions demonstrated a growing discontent over the 
Clinton administration's Haiti policy during the first part of 1994.326 
On June 30, 1994,. the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held 
hearings regarding the Haitian situation. A major concern was whether 
the United States was planning to invade Haiti. Top foreign policy 
advisers reiterated that the Clinton administration was relying on 
sanctions for the time being.327 The day before the hearing, the Senate 
rejected a measure by a sixty-five to thirty-four vote that would have 
required the President to obtain authorization from Congress before 
taking any military action in Haiti. However, it voted ninety-three to 
four for a non-binding resolution that would require the President to seek 
approval from Congress before committing United States troops to 
324. S. Res. 2027, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 140 CONG. REC. S4464 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 
1994). 
325. John M. Goshko, Senators Seek New Sanctions Against Haiti, Bill Would 
Impose Trade Ban, Cut Links, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1994, at Al 5. 
326. See generally Steven Greenhouse, Clinton Policy Toward Haiti Comes Under 
Growing Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1994, at A2 (specific mention is made of David C. 
Obey's (D-Wis), Chairman, House Appropriations Committee, call for armed intervention 
in Haiti to restore democracy). See also, Kevin Merida, Obey Calls for Invasion To Oust 
Haiti's Rulers, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1994, at A7; Julie Cohen, It's Showdown Time on 
Haiti, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 18, 1994, at 5 (discussing various efforts to influence the 
President's Haiti policy including the following: a letter writing campaign by the 
NAACP; a union demand that certain loopholes allowing United States' companies to 
do business in Haiti be closed; the House legislation; the hunger strike by Randall 
Robinson, President of Transafrica; and the fact that several lawmakers from Congress 
were willing to be arrested in front of the White House to protest the Clinton 
administration's policy). 
327. See Ann Devroy & Barton Gellman, Exodus From Haiti Strains US. Policy, 
MilitaryinterventionConsidered,WASH. POST, July 2, 1994, at Al (statements attributed 
to Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Secretary of Defense William J. Perry 
arguing that the sanction process must be allowed to work before an invasion is seriously 
considered); see also Elaine Sciolino, Haiti Invasion Not Imminent, Envoy Says, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 4, 1994, at A2 (William H. Gray, III, President Clinton's special envoy to 
Haiti, stated that while an invasion of Haiti was not imminent, the United States was 
taking actions to protect the thousands of Americans located on the island). 
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Haiti.328 These Senate actions demonstrate that there was considerable 
apprehension at the prospect of a military intervention in Haiti for the 
purpose of eliminating the de facto rulers, and returning President 
Aristide to power. 
IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Haiti dilemma has been a difficult domestic and foreign policy 
problem for successive White House administrations throughout the 
1980s and 1990s. From the foreign policy perspective, it tests the 
United States' commitment to democracy in the Caribbean, a region 
geographically close to the United States where democracy is by no 
means firmly established as part of its political culture. It also tests 
whether human rights will continue to be a tenet of United States foreign 
policy in the post-Cold War period. This applies to State actions within 
its sovereign territories, including the territorial sea, as well as externally 
beyond the convenient political shield of sovereignty. 
In addition, the Haitian refugee situation is an excellent opportunity 
to study, evaluate, and consider changes in the post-Cold War overseas 
refugee program, whether through in-country .processing or refugee 
processing within the interdiction program. From the domestic 
perspective, the treatment of Haitian asylum seekers under immigration 
law and policy continues to pose considerable questions and challenges 
not only for the executive branch, but also for the Congress and the 
federal courts, given the impact on future refugee and migration 
flows. 329 This final section of the Article will provide certain observa-
328. Associated Press, Visas Revoked for Haitians Seeking to Travel to US., WASH. 
POST, June 30, 1994, at A26. 
329. During the June 15, 1994, congressionalsubcommitteehearingonHaiti, certain 
subcommittee members reaffirmed to revisit the need for the Cuban Adjustment Act in 
light of both the Haitian refugee situation and the end of the Cold War. A bill, H.R. 
3854 (Kopetski, D-OR) was introduced in the 103d Congress that would repeal the 
Cuban Adjustment Act and it was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary. See 
Developments in the LegislativeBranch, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 315 (1994) (the bill would 
grant Cubans who entered the United States before the enactment of the act a grace 
period of two years to apply for adjustment of status to permanent residency; once the 
grace period expired, Cubans would not be conferred special treatment). 
Subcommittee members noted that there needed to be consistency in processing 
refugees under United States law. While the well-founded fear standard is the basic 
refugee definition, it was noted that the Cuban Adjustment Act and the Lautenberg 
Amendment standard deviate from the well-founded fear standard (notes of hearing on 
file with author). The Lautenberg Amendment is another Cold War legacy. It allows 
certain nationals of the former Soviet Union, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia who were 
granted parole after they were denied refugee status and who were admitted into the 
United States between August 15, 1988, and September 30, 1990, to adjust status to 
permanent residency. The benefits were extended to eligible persons who were paroled 
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tions and recommendations in both the domestic and foreign policy 
areas. 
A. President Clinton Reverses Policy of Kennebunkport Declaration 
As stated above, negotiations between parties in the Haitian conflict 
stalled during the early part of 1994. The stalemate was caused in large 
part by a shift in the United States policy, supported by the United Na-
tions, .that sought to delay President Aristide's return and called for 
Haiti's military ruler to leave office at the same time that an interim 
government was appointed. The new policy also granted amnesty to 
senior military officials.330 Some called the plan "an unworkable and 
morally repugnant compromise that Aristide was right to reject."331 To 
President Aristide and his supporters, the Clinton administration was not 
doing anything significant to either restore him to power, or to curtail 
the "campaign of terror" that was being unleashed against his supporters 
in Haiti, described by Aristide as "a house on fire."332 Disturbing 
news of politically motivated killings, disappearances, and rapes 
continued to come from Haiti.333 The United States was still refus-
ing to grant Temporary Protected Status to Haitians in the United States 
into the United States before October l, 1994. For a discussion of the Lautenberg 
Amendment, see GORDON ET AL., supra note 36, § 34.04[9][a]. 
330. John M. Goshko, US. Seeks Aristide 's Cooperation, New Plan Would Put 
Greater Pressure on Haitian Military, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1994, at Al 1. The U.S. 
plan would have required three simultaneous events: (I) Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras, the 
military ruler, Would retire; (2) President Aristide would appoint a Prime Minister from 
abroad; and (3) the Haitian parliament would grant amnesty to the military for actions 
arising out of the September 1991 coup d'etat. Id. 
331. Editorial, New US. Haiti Policy: Idealistic but Impractical, NEWSDA Y, Mar. 
29, 1994, at A38; see also Tom Squitieri, US. Policy Aids Allies of Haiti Coup, USA 
Today, Mar. 30, 1994, at IA (discussing planned extension of a loophole to circumvent 
the embargo created by the Bush administration that permitted the export of certain 
goods to the United States as a means of keeping Haitians from leaving the island). 
332. See Steven Greenhouse, Aristide Condemns Clinton's Haiti Policy as Racist, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1994, at Al. 
333. Associated Press, Haitian Soldiers Reportedly Kill 23, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 
1994, at Al 1. "The soldiers raided a seaside neighborhood near the city of Gonaives, 
shooting indiscriminately at people gathering firewood on the beach." Id. The area 
attacked is a west coast slum that recently experienced a struggle between Aristide 
supporters and neo-Duvalierist militants, the Front for the Advancement and Progress in 
Haiti. Id.; see also Bradley Graham, US. Holds Evacuation Exercise, WASH. POST, July 
14, 1994, at Al (explaining that United Nations monitors have registered 340 killings, 
131 disappearances, and 52 politically motivated rapes from May to June 1994). 
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for fear that it would foment more migration outflow in the Windward 
Passage. 334 
During the first part of 1994, the economic embargo appeared to be 
failing as a decisive form of diplomatic coercion against the de facto 
rulers. The embargo was being broken by activities along the Hai-
tian/Dominican border. 335 In addition, there were reports 'that by 
controlling the activities related to smuggled gasoline supplies, Haitian 
military rulers were becoming rich.336 It was against this background 
that the Coast Guard intercepted a sixty-five foot freighter carrying 400 
Haitians within four miles of the Florida coast. 337 
On May 8, 1994, President Clinton announced that certain changes 
would be made regarding the United States' policy on Haitian 
boatpeople. The United States would continue the interdiction program 
while eliminating the policy of forcible repatriation without determining 
334. The INS opposed granting TPS to Haitians in the United States. See Sale 
Testimony, supra note 303, at 11-13. According to the INS, the TPS proposals before 
Congress were inconsistent with the established TPS procedures under the INA. Further, 
the INS contends that the definition of Haitian nationals covered under the legislative 
proposals would create "a huge magnet" that would have induced even more departures. 
Id The INS contended that the legislative TPS proposals were too open-ended and 
exceeded the 18 month period allowed by law. However, the legislative language could 
have been structured to cover the situation of Haitian nationals already in the United 
States. These included three groups: (1) those who fled Haiti after the coup d'etat and 
were pre-screened at Guantanamo Bay and paroled into the United States to pursue their 
asylum applications; (2) Haitians who entered the United States directly and were placed 
in exclusion proceedings without any prescreening of their asylum claims; and (3) 
Haitians who are in undocumented status or may be in an undocumented status should 
their temporary visas expire while the de facto rulers are still in control of Haiti. It 
would not have been unusual for Congress to direct the Attorney General to grant TPS 
to a specific nationality. When the TPS provisions were enacted under the Immigration 
Act of 1990, Congress directed the Attorney General to grant TPS to Salvadorans. See 
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 303, 104 Stat. 4978, 5036 (1990). 
The nonprotection of Haitians in the United States probably sent the wrong message to 
the Haitian de facto rulers that the United States was not sufficiently serious about the 
human rights conditions in Haiti. In fact, the United States has not deported any 
Haitians since the coup d'etat. Granting Haitians in the United States TPS would have 
been an appropriate manner to protect these individuals until conditions in Haiti became 
safe enough for their return. 
335. Howard W. French, Embargo Creates 'Oil Boom' Near Haitian Border, N.Y. 
TIMES (International), Mar. 13, 1994, at A3. 
336. Douglas Farah, US. Fills Up in Haiti With Smuggled Gas, Generals Reap 
Profits From Embargo Intended to Oust Them, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1994, at AL 
337. Booth, supra note 98, at A3. The Haitians were to be taken to the Krome 
Detention Center and allowed to assert political asylum claims. Those with relatives in 
the area could be "paroled" while the asylum adjudication was pending, and could be 
assisted through certain programs operated by nonprofit organizations which provided 
basic resettlement needs and legal representation. 
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refugee status.338 In this regard, the United States was upholding, in 
theory, the principle of nonrefoulement. This new policy relied on 
international cooperation in processing the Haitian boatpeople. Agree-
ments with both Jamaica and the United Kingdom were reached.339 
For example, on June 2, 1994, the United States and Jamaica signed a 
memorandum of understanding under which a hospital ship, the USNS 
Comfort, was to be used for on-board processing. The arrangement with 
the United Kingdom would permit the United States to conduct on-shore 
processing at the islands of Turks and Caicos located south of the 
Bahamas.340 The first group of boatpeople were processed on the 
USNS Comfort on June 17, 1994, and six of the thirty-five interviewed 
were granted refugee status.341 By the end of June more than 5,000 
Haitians were pulled from the sea. The tremendous numbers over-
whelmed the USNS Comfort and the United States was forced to reopen 
Guantanamo Bay to process refugees.342 
One of the more significant improvements advanced by the new policy 
was that refugee status was now granted to those who qualified. 
Previously, during the post-coup d'etat period, and before the 
Kennebunkport Declaration, the same individuals would probably have 
received parole status as a result of being screened-in to the United 
States.343 The difference is considerable. Refugee status permits the 
Haitians to file for permanent residency in the United States after one 
year, thereby avoiding the requirement of filing an affirmative asylum 
application before the INS and, if the application is denied, confronting 
exclusion proceedings as a prelude to deportation. However, in order to 
qualify as refugees, the boatpoeple still had to meet the well-founded 
338. See generally Transcript, MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour: Show # 4923 (WNET 
television broadcast, May 9, 1994), at 3-7 (featuring background and discussion on 
Haitian policy change) (copy on file with author). 
339. See Sale Testimony, supra note 303, at 2. 
340. Id. 
341. See William Booth, 6 Haitian Boat People Clear US. Screening, WASH. POST, 
June 18, 1994, at Al2. Haitians granted refugee status were taken to Guantanamo Bay 
naval station where further processing was to occur, including medical examinations, 
before they were allowed to enter the United States. See id 
342. John F. Harris, Exodus from Haiti Strain US. Policy, WASH. POST, July 2, 
1994, at Al. 
343. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text. 
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fear of persecution standard embodied in the definition of refugee under 
domestic and international law.344 
The "well-founded fear" standard is a tougher standard than the 
"credible fear" standard used in the earlier processing. Some commenta-
tors expressed concern that the higher standard would be used as a 
justification to support the Clinton administration's assertion that only 
five percent of Haitian boatpeople were truly refugees.345 In fact, just 
the opposite was true. While this refugee processing policy was briefly 
in-place, thirty percent of Haitian boatpeople qualified for refugee 
status. 346 As a result, more Haitians took to the sea. Soon the pro-
cessing centers were overloaded. Therefore, the policy was altered 
during the month of July. While the United States did not forcibly 
repatriate Haitian boatpeople, it did not process them as refugees, or 
parolees for that matter, for entry into the United States. Instead, the 
United States offered a safe haven outside United States territory to 
almost all Haitian boatpeople interdicted at sea. Haitians were offered 
the opportunity to stay in temporary refugee camps, or to return 
voluntarily to their home country. The only way that Haitians could 
qualify for actual refugee status was to participate in the ICP pro-
gram. 347 . 
B. In-Country Processing Should Be Evaluated 
The United States should evaluate in-country processing (ICP) in light 
of its Haiti experience. Haitian ICP had a very low approval rate of 
around seven percent.348 Changes were made to the ICP during the 
first part of 1994. While some changes were minor, such as replacing 
the vetting system, others were more fundamental. 349 Under the 1994 
system, interviews were granted to persons who met one of five 
344. See supra note 32. 
345. John Kifuer, Haitian Refugee Interviews Begin Aboard U.S. Navy Ship, N. Y. 
TIMES, June 17, 1994, at A3. 
346. U.S. Policy, supra note 309, at 886. 
347. See Robert Suro, Clinton's Gamble With Haiti Hinges On Refugee Response, 
WASH. POST, July 11, 1994, at AlO. 
348. See Changing U.S.-Haitian Refugee Policy: New In-Country Processing 
System; Shipboard Adjudications Resume, REFUGEE REPORTS (U.S. Committee for 
Refugees, Washington, D.C.), May 31, 1994, at 1, 2. 
349. Id The changes included requiring a photograph and identification docwnent 
for all persons completing the preliminary questionnaire. In Port-au-Prince, preliminary 
questionnaires were not filled out in the downtown offices of the International 
Organization for Migration. Instead, they were to be completed at the Rex Theater. 
Processing placed emphasis on cases referred by private agencies operating in Haiti. Id 
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criteria. 350 Once an individual met one of the criterion, he or she was 
sent to one of the refugee processing centers operated by joint voluntary 
agencies in order to prepare the alien for the INS interviews.351 These 
changes resulted in an increased approval rate of thirty percent. 
Consequently, more than 60,000 Haitians have applied for refugee status 
since the ICP began in 1992. Fifteen hundred have been granted refugee 
status.352 Much of the ICP decisionmaking has come down to the 
question of credibility. In most cases, the INS simply does not consider 
documents produced by applicants to be reliable.353 Because the 
United States uses ICP as the exception rather than the rule in overseas 
processing, ICP in Haiti is an excellent opportunity to evaluate the entire 
overseas refugee program in the post-Cold War era. There is a general 
consensus that ICP has a positive role to play, but that it should not be 
considered as a viable substitute for the right to seek asylum and 
nonrefoulement for refugees outside their countries of origin. The 
concern is that since ICP is discretionary, the regulations and case law 
governing refugee adjudications within the United States do not 
necessarily apply. Therefore, ICP has the potential of reducing refugee 
protections offered under United States domestic law.354 
350. Id The five criteria are as follows: (1) senior and mid-level government 
officials from the Aristide regime, (2) close associates of President Aristide, (3) 
educational and journalist activists who have a credible fear of persecution on account 
of their activities from the de facto authorities, (4) members of social/political 
development organizations who are high profile and have been threatened or harassed 
by the de facto authorities, and (5) persons who are of compelling concern to the United 
States and are in immediate danger on account of their actual or perceived political 
beliefs or activities. Id 
351. See supra note 257-58 (describing refugee processing centers). 
352. Haitian Numbers Drop, But Crisis Continues, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 966 
(1994) (citing a report prepared by the National Immigration Forum). 
353. See REFUGEE REPORTS, supra note 348, at 6. 
354. See Written Statement on Haitian Refugee Processing, for the House 
Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration, and Refugees, Bill Frelick, Senior 
Policy Analyst, U.S. Committee for Refugees 8-10 (June 15, 1994) (copy on file with 
author). This written statement compared Haiti ICP with the Orderly Departure Program 
in Vietnam: 
A similar in-country procedure for processing refugees was created at the 
height of the Vietnamese boat exodus. However, those who decided to flee by 
boat were never turned back because such a program existed. At the same 
time, it would have been unthinkable for the United States to have said that the 
existence of an Orderly Departure Program would mean that Vietnamese boat 
people could be summarily returned without a hearing. 
Id. at 9. 
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C. Establish Comprehensive Safe Haven Mechanisms in the 
Caribbean Basin For Refugee Emergencies 
The United States should establish comprehensive safe haven 
mechanisms for refugee emergencies in collaboration with the Organiza-
tion of American States in collaboration with the UNHCR in the 
Caribbean region. The establishment of a safe haven at Guantanamo 
Bay for Haitians was a first in United States history. Human rights 
organizations had been calling for such safe havens for several 
years. 355 Safe haven camps attend to the humanitarian needs of 
refugees, but they do not necessarily create any right or expectation of 
admission to any country. For example, Haitians knew that a safe haven 
for them would only be a temporary measure until the political situation 
in Haiti was stabilized. 356 Further, the UNHCR can participate in 
voluntary repatriation. On the other hand, safe haven camps run the risk 
of deteriorating into detention and holding centers for refugees.357 The 
U.S. must be careful to avoid such a pitfall. Additionally, the U.S. 
cannot afford to carry the entire cost of such safe havens. Other 
355. In December 1992 a number of organizations recommended a safe haven. 
These organizations included the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, the AFL-CIO, 
The American Friends Service Committee, American Immigration Lawyers Association, 
Church World Service, Human Rights Watch, Florida Rural Legal Services, International 
Rescue Committee, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Lutheran Immigration and 
Refugee Services, National Association for the Advancement ofColoredPeople, National 
Council of La Raza, Transafrica, and the U.S. Committee for Refugees. See Safe Haven, 
HAITI INSIGHT, June 4, 1994, at 3. 
In addition, the Committee on Migration, United States Catholic Conference, has 
stated: 
We understand that the Administration plans screening that applies strict 
refugee criteria. While this will allow some refugees to be resettled in the 
United States, the majority will be sent back. Reports of current conditions of 
violence in Haiti are such that we fear that many persons not meeting the refu-
gee criteria could still be at serious risk if returned to Haiti. These persons 
should not be returned. We urge the Administration to seek a land-based site 
where Haitians can wait in safety until the political situation improves in Haiti. 
Testimony of Rev. Richard Ryscavage, S.J., Executive Director, United States Catholic 
Conference, Office of Migration and Refugee Services, On H.R. 3663, H.R. 4114, and 
H.R. 4264, Judiciary Subcommittee for International Law, Immigration and Refugees, 
U.S. House of Representatives, June 15, 1994, at 11 (copy on file with author). 
356. See Safe Haven, supra note· 355, at 3. 
357. Refugee advocates who have worked at Guantanamo Bay contend that it 
functions more like a detention center than a safe haven site. While food and shelter are 
provided, living conditions are generally poor and there is a serious need for proper 
medical attention, clothing, educational, and recreational activities. See After Months on 
Guantanamo, Refugees Still Await Much Needed Relief, MONDAY (National Council of 
Churches, Church World Service Immigration and Refugee Program), Sept. 12, 1994, 
at 2 [hereinafter MONDAY I]. 
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countries in the Caribbean basin, especially countries that produce 
refugees themselves, should shoulder a greater share of the burden in 
dealing with refugee flows. 358 
D. Exclusion Proceedings Should be Extended to the Territorial Sea 
The United States should also extend procedural protections of 
exclusion proceedings to refugees apprehended in its territorial sea. Any 
vessel that crosses into the territorial waters of the United States that is 
suspected of violating the laws of the United States can be intercepted 
by the Coast Guard.359 Individuals who lack proper documents to be 
in the territory of the United States should be brought to land and placed 
in exclusion proceedings before an immigration court. The United 
States has already done this in the past, thereby establishing a justifica-
tion based on custom.360 
358. See John M. Goshko, US. Officials Defend Policy on 'Safe Havens, WASH. 
POST, July 11, 1994, at AIO (Panama finally agreed to accept 5,000 Haitians after the 
new President takes office). In addition to Panama, Dominica, Antigua, and the Turks 
and Caicos Islands offered to set up temporary refugee camps. The United States has 
not received very much support in establishing safe havens throughout the Caribbean. 
Commentators have stated that this situation is a result of Haiti's historic isolation. See 
generally MONDAY I, supra note 357. For example, when Spanish-speaking countries 
gained their independence from Spain in the early 19th century, they excluded Haiti from 
any type ofregional community, and the United States itself did not formally recognize 
Haiti until 1862 (Haiti became independent in 1804). According to Randall Robinson, 
Executive Director of Transafrica Forum, the Panamanian government backed out of 
their pledge to accept 10,000 refugees because "[p]eople were very afraid of having 
Haitians in the country and justifiably so ... they were afraid of competing for scarce 
resources, afraid of people whose culture is different in many ways, afraid of the AIDS 
problem. .. That is why the governments backed out and everything else is excuses." 
Roberto Suro, Haiti's History of Isolation Makes US. Task Harder, WASH. POST, July 
25, 1994, at Al, Al4. 
The same could be said of other governments in the region. See Suro, supra, at Al; 
see also /CV A Finds Haitians Unwelcome in a Number of Carribean Countries, 
MONDAY, Aug. I, 1994, at 1-3. A special team of the International Council of 
Voluntary Agencies travelling through the Caribbean found that Haitians are unwelcome 
in a number of Caribbean countries. The mission concluded that Haitians are generally 
not welcome because of existing problems with illegal immigrants. The countries visited 
have their own problems and fear that they would become magnets for future flows. 
Haitian refugees are seen as a United States problem and procedures for determining 
refugee status were flawed or nonexistent, hence a regional solution was seen as desir-
able. 
359. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1988) (Jaw enforcement provisions for boarding vessels to 
prevent, detect, and supress violations of the laws of the United States). 
360. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. 
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Further, in the Sale decision, the Supreme Court held that exclusion 
proceedings and the obligation to provide nonrefoulement do not apply 
extraterritorially. Therefore, the Court could conceivably apply the 
procedural protections of exclusion proceedings and the obligation to 
provide nonrefoulement within the territorial waters of the United 
States.361 This is an issue the federal courts may be forced to decide 
in the future. 
E. The Caribbean Challenge 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the United States has confronted 
difficult policy choices regarding the treatment of Haitian asylum-seekers 
and efforts to establish democracy in Haiti, one of only two non-
democracies in the Americas.362 Geography has not given the United 
States a choice in the matter and history may create a similar situation 
in the greater Caribbean basin.363 During the summer of 1994, the 
Haitian de facto authorities expelled the UN-OAS team of human rights 
observers and the United Nations Security Council issued a United 
States-initiated resolution labeling such actions as "provocative behavior 
[which] directly affects the peace and security of the region. "364 A 
subsequent resolution gave greater authority for the United States to 
assemble an invasion force. 365 Such language and Security Council 
actions moved the question of a United Nations sanctioned intervention 
forward, although most diplomats preferred to give economic sanctions 
more time to work; meanwhile Congress was very uneasy about a United 
361. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text. 
362. The other remaining non-democracy is Cuba. See American Survey; Beached, 
THE ECONOMIST, June 11, 1994, at 22. 
363. As far as the greater Caribbean basin is concerned, Mexico is undergoing a 
delicate and slow move toward multiparty democracy, El Salvador and Nicaragua are 
emerging from civil wars and are experimenting with post-civil war democracy, and 
Guatemala has an active guerilla movement. Cuba and the Dominican Republic are 
clearly potential refugee-producing countries. The other larger Caribbean islands of 
Jamaica and Puerto Rico appear to have embraced a democratic political culture for the 
foreseeable future. 
364. See Douglas Farah, Rights Observers to Quit Haiti Today, Director of U.N-
OAS Team Expresses 'Indignation and Sadness,' WASH. POST, July 13, 1994, at A24. 
365. In language similar to that used preceding the Persian Gulfinvasion, the United 
Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations 
adopted Resolution 940 which authorized the formation of a multinational force with the 
goal: "[T]o use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military 
leadership, consistent with the Governor's Island Agreement, the prompt return of the 
legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the 
Government of Haiti .... " U.N Resolution for Invasion of Haiti, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
1, 1994, at A6. The vote was 12-0 with Brazil and China abstaining, and Rwanda 
absent. Id. 
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States initiated invasion. 366 It was abundantly clear toward the end of 
August 1994 that the economic embargo had forced the collapse of 
Haiti's economy, but not the demise of the de facto rulers.367 
A new refugee crisis originating in Cuba, moreover, diverted United 
States' political and military intentions from Haiti.368 During August 
1994 the Cuban government announced that it would not prevent its 
citizens from leaving their homeland. Some thirty-thousand Cubans, 
also known as balseros, took to the Florida Straits for the United 
States.369 The possibility of a mass refugee influx similar to the 
Mariel boatlift 370 prompted a radical change in United States immigra-
tion policy toward Cuban refugees.371 The twenty-eight-year-old 
immigration policy that allowed Cubans paroled or admitted into the 
United States and physically present for one year to become permanent 
residents was terrninated.372 Cuban balseros are now treated like the 
366. It has been noted that there is a particularly sensitive reason for other countries, 
especially those in Latin America and the Caribbean, to resist military intervention in 
Haiti. Latin American countries have a traditional distaste for United States military 
intervention. A recent example of that distaste was an OAS resolution which condemned 
the invasion of Panama in 1989. This was the first time in the OAS's history that the 
United States was formally criticized. See Suro, supra note 358, at Al. The United
States is sentient enough to obtain United Nations supported authority to invade, but this 
may not allay the traditional suspicion of countries who have experienced United States 
military intervention or direct United States political influence during the past century. 
A list of these countries includes Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and Grenada. See generally Larry 
Rohter, Remembering The Past; Repeating It Anyway, N. Y. TIMES, July 24, 1994, § 4, 
at I, 4. For a view of pre-invasion concerns, see Helen Dewar, Senate Defeats GOP 
Bid to Force Vote Prior to Haitilnvasion, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1994, at AS ("in votes 
in both houses ... lawmakers have expressed strong reservations about U.S. military 
involvement in Haiti"); Kevin Fedarko, Policy at Sea, TIME, July 18, 1994, at 20; see 
also Fleming, supra note 297, at 1540 (Special Haiti Envoy, William H. Gray III, 
appearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee). 
367. See Douglas Farah, Embargo Has Haiti's Economy Near Collapse, but Rulers 
Stand Firm, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1994, at A20. 
368. See Slow-Motion Mariel, supra note 134, at 1091-93. 
369. See U.S., Cuba Reach Important Migration Agreement, 71 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 1213 (1994). 
370. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37. 
371. Slow-Motion Mariel, supra note 134, at 1091. 
372. The policy was a result of the Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act. See supra note 
38; see also Ann Devroy, U.S. Raises Barriers To Cuban Refugees, Clinton Plans to 
Tighten Isolation of Castro, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 1994, at Al (the formal policy 
reversal was made by Janet Reno, United States Attorney General, to the INS); Carroll 
J. Doherty, Influx of Cubans Forces Clinton To Halt Automatic Asylum, 52 CONG. Q. 
2464 (Aug. 20, 1994); Bob Benson, Dissonant Voices Urge Clinton To Revise Policy on 
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Haitian boat people before them. They are rescued from the Florida 
Straits by the Coast Guard and sent to Guantanamo Bay.373 Any 
Cuban refugee who actually makes it to the United States is either 
detained or placed in a "safe haven."374 Since the United States does 
not have a repatriation agreement with Cuba, the balseros are not 
forcibly repatriated to their homeland. However, Cubans at Guantanamo 
Bay may avail themselves of voluntary repatriation.375 
In order to stem the refugee flow, the United States and Cuba entered 
into negotiations.376 On September 9, 1994, they signed an agreement 
in which the United States promised to accept at least twenty-thousand 
legal immigrants per year.377 The would-be immigrants will be 
Cuba, 52 CONG. Q. 2498 (Aug. 27, 1994). 
373. As of this date, 32,051 Cubans have been picked up by the Coast Guard, and 
there are approximately 30,000 refugees on Guantanamo Bay, 600 at the Krome 
Detention Center in Florida, and 1,000 in Texas and Panama. See Vernon Silver, Some 
Cubans Are Released From Detention in Florida, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1994, at A6. 
374. See Jon Nordheimer, Some Cubans Wait in Detention Center, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 21, 1994, at A28. 
375. The Cuban refugee crisis and the United States' efforts to move forward with 
voluntary repatriation triggered legal action on behalf of the refugees in the 11th Circuit. 
Cuban American Bar Ass'n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1995). A federal 
district court ordered the United States not to engage in voluntary repatriation of Cubans 
located at Guantanamo Bay until lawyers for Cuban Refugee Service Organizations had 
an opportunity to meet with the refugees for the purpose of ascertaining if their 
repatriation decision was truly voluntary. The scope of the order was limited to the 
issues of voluntary repatriation and right to access under the First Amendment. Id at 
1413. The preliminary injunction was overturned a few days later by an appeals panel. 
While the court of appeals allowed the government to continue with voluntary 
repatriation, it did allow attorneys who had written retainers "reasonable access" to 
refugees. For a discussion of the Cuban refugee litigation, see Judge Bars Cuban 
Repatriations, but Court of Appeals Disagrees, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1474-76 
(1994); As Litigation Continues, US. Considers Policy Shift on Guantanamo Cubans, 
INS Kicks Off Cuban Lottery, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1548-49 (1994); Litigation 
Continues over Parole for Haitian and Cuban Childrenat Guantanamo, 71 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 1593-94 (1994). It is worthwhile to note that both plaintiffs and defendants 
rely on the Interdiction Cases to support their legal theories. 
376. President Castro agreed to negotiate because he also wanted to discuss an end 
to the trade embargo that the United States had maintained against Cuba for over thirty 
years. See Larry Rohter, Castro, The Man With Few Cards, Always Winds Up the 
Dealer, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1994, § 4, at 1, 4. 
377. The agreement was issued as a joint communique. The first section deals with 
safety of life at sea and stipulates that the United States will take Cubans rescued at sea 
to safe havens. Parole will not be given to Cubans who actually reach the shores of the 
United States. Cuba will take preventive measures to ensure that there will be no unsafe 
departures. 
The second section pledges cooperation on the question of alien smuggling. 
The third section covers the question of legal migration, with the United States 
ensuring Cuba that total legal migration to the U.S. from Cuba will be a minimum of 
20,000 Cubans each year, not including immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. 
The fourth section states that voluntary return of Cubans arriving in the United States 
or in safe havens will be accomplished through diplomatic channels on or after August 
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processed through the United States Interests Section in Havana.378 
There is every indication that the migration accord will be implemented 
by both sides. 379 Having averted a Cuban refugee crisis, Haiti once 
again became the primary focus of United States foreign policy in the 
Caribbean. 
The Clinton administration patiently enlisted the support of other 
nations to either pledge troops to participate in an invasion of Haiti, or 
to partake in peacekeeping efforts in the aftermath of the military 
incursion.380 A military invasion seemed the inevitable endgame to 
diminish the refugee crisis, to limit human rights abuses, to return 
President Aristide and assist the Haitians in their efforts to establish 
democracy, as well as to revive the United States' credibility after 
repeated public threats of intervention.381 Last minute diplomacy 
averted an invasion, but not a military intervention.382 On September 
19, 1994. 
The fifth section stipulates that both countries will continue to discuss excludable 
Cuban nationals from the United States. 
The final section of the agreement schedules a future meeting to review the joint 
communique and that future meetings will be scheduled by mutual agreement. The Joint 
Communique, reprinted in Appendix I, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1236 (1994). 
378. See State Dept. Implements Cuban Migration Agreement, 71 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 1409-10 (1994). The U.S. will process immigrants and will "identify new 
facilities to accommodate the expanded processing." Id. 
379. The United States will use a combination of the regular immigrant visa 
issuance, parole, an expanded use of the definition ofrefugee that will allocate 6,000 of 
the 8,000 refugee admissions set aside for Latin America, and a new lottery system 
consisting of 6,000 admissions to implement the migration agreement. According to the 
State Department, "Havana will become one of the largest immigrant visa-issuingposts 
it ... has anywhere in the world." Id. at 1410. 
380. See John F. Harris, Force Grows For Invasion of Haiti, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 
1994, at Al (most nations declined the invitation to provide troops for the actual 
invasion, but were willing to provide troops for peacekeeping purposes which after 
several months would replace the invasion force). 
381. See Ann Devroy, White House Steps Up Invasion Talk, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 
1994, at Al, A36. 
382. For a comprehensive discussion on the United States occupation of Haiti, see 
Special Report, Here We Go Again, Grenada, Panama, Somalia . .. Now as an Invasion 
Force or a Peacekeeping One, U.S. Troops Head for Uncertain Occupation of Haiti, 
NEWSWEEK, at 22-36 (Sept. 26, 1994). 
The military intervention of Haiti triggered a long-standing constitutional dispute 
between the executive and legislative branches of government over the need to obtain 
congressional approval before military action. Under the United States Constitution, the 
president serves as the "commander-in-chief," and the legislature has the authority "to 
declare war." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (the Congress has the power "[t]o 
declare war ... "); U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 1 ("The President shall be Commander-
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15, 1994, President Clinton announced that a special team of negotiators 
had reached an agreement with the de facto rulers and that United States 
troops would start landing in Haiti the following day, which they 
did.383 
Disarming and rebuilding the Haitian military and police forces, 
ending the economic embargoes, obtaining international development 
aid, and assisting in the democratic process are tasks that the internation-
al community, led by the United States, is in the process of developing 
and completing. In a country with almost no social, penal, political, or 
strong economic structures presently in place, some of these tasks are 
quite formidable. For example, legislative and municipal elections that 
were envisioned as crucial steps toward resuming the democratic process 
in-Chief ... "). 
The administration claims that Haiti is a "police-action" which does not rise to the 
level of war, and compares Haiti to the Caribbean invasions of Grenada in 1983 and 
Panama in 1989. In addition, it alleges that the invasion is "fully consistent with ... 
practice and well within the president's constitutional authority." See Marcus, supra note 
28, at A 18 (statement by AssistantAttorney General Walter E. Dellinger, Office of Legal 
Counsel, Department of Justice). Some commentators have stated that because the U.N. 
Security Council authorized the invasion, United States military intervention in Haiti is 
not a unilateral offensive action contemplated by the War Powers Clause. Id. (statement 
by Robert F. Turner, Associate Director, Center for National Security Law, University 
of Virginia). Regardless of the War Powers Clause, the Clinton administration has stated 
that it expects to comply with the 1973 War Powers Resolution, which requires the 
President to inform Congress when troops are exposed to hostilities and further imposes 
a 60-day limit on the deployment of troops abroad without congressional authorization. 
Id. (statement by Mr. Dellinger); see also WILLIAM B. LOCKHART, ET AL., CONSTITIJ-
TIONAL LAW 309-13 (1975) (providing discussion and text of War Powers Resolution). 
After much debating, Congress essentially gave President Clinton carte blanche to 
proceed with the military mission and did not impose any troop withdrawal deadlines. 
See Carroll J. Doherty, Hill Wary of Putting Strings on Military Mission, 52 CONG. Q. 
2816 (Oct. 1, 1994); Carroll J. Doherty, Congress, After Sharp Debate, Gives Clinton a 
Free Hand, 52 CONG. Q. 2895 (Oct. 8, 1994). 
383. Negotiators for the United States were President Jimmy Carter, General Colin 
Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn. For the text of both the President Clinton's address and 
the United States-Haiti agreement, see WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1994, at Al 7. See also 
Douglas Jehl, Multinational Force of I5,000 to Pave Way for Aristide Return, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 19, 1994, at Al. Under the terms of the agreement, the Haitian military and 
police will cooperate with the United States military mission, the military rulers will 
leave office either when the Haitian Parliament votes for a general amnesty or October, 
15, 1994, (whichever is earlier), the economic embargoes will be lifted, and the 
forthcoming legislative elections will "be held in a free and democratic manner." Id. at 
A8. 
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slated for December 1994 were postponed.384 Three rounds of elec-
tions were finally held during the latter part of 1995.385 i
With the military iintervention, in country processing has been 
discontinued in Haiti. 386 According to both the UNHCR and refugee 
advocates, over 4,000 Haitian refugees who remained at Guantanamo 
Bay by the end of December 1994 and who refused repatriation were 
coerced into returning to Haiti at a time when Haiti was clearly 
experiencing uncertain political transition. 387 These Haitians contend 
that paramilitary gangs still function in places that are not frequented by 
U.S. troops. Critics of this policy feel that INS interviews were 
performed in "cursory" fashion and did not use the "well-founded fear 
of persecution standard" embodied in the 1951 Convention and the 1967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. The United States, 
however, claims that neither domestic law nor international refugee 
standards apply under the circumstances because Haitians at Guantanamo 
Bay are not being considered for resettlement in the United States. 388 
Commentators question where the United States derives the authority, 
under either domestic law or international law, to repatriate foreign 
nationals, without a repatriation agreement with the government of Haiti, 
directly from a third country-Cuba. 389 
384. Reuter, Haiti Planning April Election For Parliament, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 
1995, at Al 7 (according to Haitian Prime Minister Smarck Michel, the latest plans call 
for elections in April, but he also stated that "many opponents of President Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide are still armed and the security situation remains 'fragile"'). 
385. See Julia Preston, Age of Aristide: Haiti Calmed After a Year, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 20, 1995, at A14. The first round of elections was held in June, 1995, during 
which many irregularities were reported. Id. The other two rounds were boycotted by 
the opposing parties, which gave Mr. Aristide' s Lavalas party plenary control of both 
parliament and local governments. Id. 
386. Statement by Eric Schwartz, Director for Human Rights, Refugees & 
Humanitarian Affairs, National Security Council (Jan. 27, 1995) (the statement was 
made at a migration briefing held in Washington, D.C. at the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace) (on file with author). 
387. See Roberto Suro, U.N. Refugee Agency Says US. Violates Standards in 
Repatriating Haitians, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1995, at A 18
388. Id.; see also US. Government Begins Forced Repatriation of Haitians from 
Guantanamo,MONDAY,Jan.16, 1995, at 1-2(discussingforcedrepatriation, the UNHCR 
withdrawal from the screening process at Guantanamo Bay, and the dangerous conditions 
that remain in Haiti). 
389. See US. Now Repatriating Haitians at Guantanamo, 72 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 129 (1995) (statement from Arthur C. Helton, of the Open Society Institute 
in New York). 
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As a final thought, the United States withdrew its troops from Haiti 
by the end of March 1995.390 United Nations peacekeeping troops 
replaced them and will remain in Haiti until early 1996.391 The United 
States is in the process of re-evaluating its international commitments, 
foreign policy, and human rights goals in the aftermath of the Cold War. 
The Caribbean, however, remains its immediate regional challenge. 392 
390. See Douglas Farah, To Clinton, Mission Accomplished; to Haitians, Hopes 
Dashed, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1995, at Al. While many Haitians would have liked a 
more complete disarmament, they appear content that the dismantling of the army "gives 
civilian society a chance at creating a democracy." Id at A20. 
391. See Larry Rohter, U.N Force Takes Up Duties in Haiti, N.Y. TIMES 
(International), Apr. 2, 1995, at 14. The U.N. peacekeeping force consists of approxi-
mately 6,000 military troops and personnel, and 900 civilian police. Countries 
contributing troops to the peacekeeping efforts include Argentina, Bangladesh, Canada, 
the Caribbean community, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Nepal, The Netherlands, 
Pakistan, and Saurian. Id 
392. The Haitian situation is being revisited by Cuban boatpeople who have been 
"offered" safe haven at Guantanamo Bay. Refugee advocates and government officials 
have begun to compare this situation with that of the Haitians. For a discussion of the 
"parallels and differences" between Cuba and Haiti, see Bill Frelick, Needed: A 
ComprehensiveSolutionforCubanRefugees, 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 121-23 (1995). 
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